In recent years, Moscow's relations with Nato evolved along a vicious cycle of love and hate: musings about potential Russian membership in the Alliance were followed by Nato's eastward enlargement and mutual animosity. This essay analyzes Russia's internal debate on its relations with Nato over 1990s and the reasons behind Russia's contradictory policies on Nato expansion. These were determined to a large extent by Russia's authoritarian modernizers' craving for a seat in the Alliance perceived as a military-political equivalent of "the West" and of the center of the world system. This holistic image neglected the controversial status of Nato and its expansion within Western world, not to speak of the rest of the global community, and the intensity of debates between Euroatlantic expansionists and their domestic opponents. This misperception, along with the Kremlin's short-term interests, enabled Western expansionists to engage Russia on their terms in a bargaining process, which made the bulk of Russia's foreign policy elite an often unconscious participant of Nato expansion and intervention. Russia's policies oscillated between utopian embrace of a North Atlantic community from Vancouver to Vladivostok (which, if ever achieved, might lead to an institutionalization of the North-South divide, thus pitting Russia against its own southern neighbors), and, on the other hand, fatalistic resignation before an enlargement that was perceived as inevitable, however unpleasant, geopolitical development. In addition, Moscow's approach to Nato was driven by internal cold war between Russia's authoritarian reformers and the parliament, which was not to be allowed to set the agenda and emerge as a decision-making force in foreign policy. This helps explain Moscow's consent that the Nato-Russia Founding Act be in fact an executive agreement rather than a legally binding treaty. These internal and self-imposed constraints on Russia's diplomacy helped to shape an outcome that, judging by Western sources, was far from predetermined.

In contradistinction to A.J.Toynbee, O.Spengler and S.Huntington, the author maintains that the civilization is the culture's "body" while the culture is the civilization's "soul". Russia's main search for the idea consists in overcoming of the gap between the civilization and culture and the principal aim of the country consists not of becoming a part of the West or achieving and defining its essential difference from the West but, in collaboration with the West, to create an universal human supranational civilization which is the only alternative to the dissociation of civilizations. According to the author, "the society of culture" is the sole acceptable model of the global civilization.

The Eurasian idea which emerged as a reaction of the Russian national conscience to upheaval of 1917 in Russia involved in its orbit prominent figures of the Russian culture and aristocracy who emigrated from Russia. The proponents of the Eurasian idea were distinguished by a clear understanding of the fact that the power of Russia was determined by its culture while a habit to pay attention to external achievements of civilization (in an attempt to catch up with the West) would lead to a gross undervaluation. That, in its turn, made Russians doomed to the blind imitation of foreign samples and models. All that would bring about the degradation of culture. The proponents of the Eurasian idea saw the Russian culture creators' irresponsibility, their predisposition to imitation, their inability to evaluate the Russian originality properly as the principal cause of the Russian revolution. The Eurasians did not accept changes of the political order or fundamental ideas if these changes were not accompanied and even caused by cultural changes.

Taking relations between Russia and the Crimean khanate in the early 17th century as an example, the author demonstrates the importance which the Tsars of Russia imparted to contacts with the world outside of Russia. The period under consideration was characterized by the exceptionally difficult situation inside Russia. In ten years five supreme rulers succeeded each other in Russia, yet each of these autocrats (including the so-called "impostors", or false Tsars) devoted a great attention to the foreign policy. The author considers all messengers and embassies sent to the Crimean khanate as well as the reciprocal diplomatic missions and demonstrates the importance these relations had for Russia.

The author considers the carrier of N.A.Bulganin who ascended from a security guard at a provincial manufacturing plant to the position of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The author also considers the wreckage of this brilliant carrier which happened after the attempt to demise Khruschev when Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, members of the so called "anti-Party group", succeeded in winning Bulganin over. The author points out that Bulganin was one of the most educated members of the government of those times (anyway he graduated from the "real" public school) but did not plume himself on his superiority, was loyal to comrades and was not avid for leading positions.

As World War II was drawing to a close, U.S. policymakers, diplomats and publicists worried about the future of the international system but, even more than that, about the American national interest in each of its components. Given their country's overwhelming power, they now expected to refashion the world in America's image and establish "the American century". They intended to promote world peace, foster international stability, safeguard national security, perpetuate American power and prosperity in spite of the growing strength of the Soviet Union and its new role in the European affairs and geopolitical situation as a whole. The Hamilton Armstrong's memorandum for the Secretary of State (E.Stettinius), written on the eve of the Yalta conference, reveals the new global view of the American foreign policy ideologists, convinced in the superiority of the American values, as well as economic and military power.

The author deals with N.Mordvinov, the thinker and statesman. It is unknown to the general public that as early as in the very beginning of the 19th century there were Russian scientists who contributed to the world economic science. Having meticulously studied works of foreign economists, Mordvinov applied their discoveries to Russian reality and developed these discoveries, with the Russian peculiarities taken into consideration. According to the author, Mordvinov's essay on private provincial banks is of particular interest, for Mordvinov in that work stated his opinion on the monetary system and budget, i.e., on the issues which were within the sphere of his official duties (for some time Mordvinov was the chief of the State Economy Department of the Russian State Council).

Analyzing the key problems of the Russian political process (a possible position of Russia in the contemporary world, politicians' striving for a personal success absolutely separated from the social result of politicians' activities, confrontations among the elite corporations, Chechnya war issue, threat posed by the terrorist Islam, the power's attempts to change control of the elite for surprise assaults upon the elite groups), the author demonstrates that the Russian authorities still lack an understanding of the realistic strategy and aims, i. e., the power in Russia still lacks qualities intrinsic to any power subject. Being unable to mobilize the society for enhancement of its own might the power erroneously suppose that the social inertness and the opposition's weakness ensure security of the power. Moreover, the power tries to control by applying pressure against its enfeebled opponents. But this kind of pressure throws the opposition in the enemies of Russia arms, makes the social and elite consolidation impossible and weakens the power even more. The state without the society is dead. And we have to undertake whatever we can to change this situation.

The author examines logic and mechanisms employed in the course of the Soviet industrial system's two modernizations which were undertaken in 1930s and in 1950-1960s. The first modernization represented the economic component of a peculiar supernational social macro-project which integrated values of the Soviet society and was a response to the crisis of the Western civilization model. The second modernization provided for adaptation of the Soviet industrial system to new conditions of the Soviet society development which emerged in the post- WWII period. The examination is carried from interdisciplinary positions. The conventional economic analysis is strengthened with examination of social and cultural dimensions of the Soviet modernization and of the structure of the Soviet world economy etc. The model of the Soviet industrial system which resulted from the two modernizations up to 1970s provided for dynamic economic growth within which the standards of living visibly improved, large scale defensive programs were initiated and developed and manufacturing was being switched to new generations of technologies. The same model predetermined the limits of evolutionary self-development of the Soviet industrial system as regards aims and targets of the self-development and the systemic resources employed.

Large-scale changes in a state and a society always put the problem of relationship between the secular and spiritual authorities. That is why the confrontation between Patriarch Nikon and Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich was not an accident. "Case of Nikon" was a way to resolve the problem of the two authorities' co-existence in the period of the absolute monarchy making. That way was a very painful one but it to a great extent predetermined "no conflict" scenarios of subsequent confrontations between the secular and Church authorities.

The publication of little known working notes on background of Yalta conference by Charles E.Bohlen - a prominent American diplomat of 1940-1960-s and an active participant of Yalta proceedings sheds new light on the old debate about Franklin D.Roosevelt policy toward the Soviet Union. Was Yalta an honest mistake, a betrayal of American interests, or a realistic compromise? Which side was primarily responsible for Yalta's unfulfilled promise? Bohlen's case for FDR's realism, while quite convincing in some respects, goes too far in absolving the US from any responsibility for the collapse of the Grand Alliance. Yalta's ambiguous legacy remains an important lesson for future American-Russian relations.

The author asserts that standards of justice are prerequisite for survival of the Russians and normal existence of any society. In some fundamental sense, all the Russians need is the restoration of the very notion of justice. Events of the past 15 years, the miserable results of these events and the current deplorable situation which seems to be hopeless are caused by apostasy from the principle of justice which has been effectively corrupted by the Soviet and post-Soviet elite.

The author examines the version that the "voluntary yet compulsory" resettlement of Jews who, due to I.V.Stalin's order, were planned to be moved from the European part of the USSR to distant parts of Siberia and Far East. This version has been widely spread in the literature for several decades. Principal components of this version, sources on which it is based and queries it raises are summed up. The attention is focused on discussion of this problem at the international symposium "The late Stalinism and the Jewish question" which was held in June, 1998, at Eistatt Catholic University, FRG. Arguments and counterarguments adduced in presentations of G.V.Kostyrchenko and V.P.Naumov, the Russian participants of the symposium. The author draws the conclusion that both parties of this protracted dispute have solid arguments as well as less convincing ones. According to the author, the question put in the title of this article cannot be answered unequivocally as yet. The facts given in the postscriptum and ascertained after the symposium confirm this conclusion.

The author sums up results of the first 100 days of Putin’s tenure, of 100 days euphoria burning out, of 100 days of choice between action and pretence of action. The author introduces the notion of «the Family» and defines it as the damaged, maimed section of the Russian society. He calls for undertaking whatever is possible to localize this section and to prevent the society as a whole from transformation into «the Family». The author refers to the recent Pushkin Square explosion and, having considered arguments brought forward in favor of the «Chechen trace» of the tragedy, makes the principal emphasis on the ascending power of the 21th century, Islam which is slowly consolidating mass, just awaken from its lethargy due to the shock of colonization, and on «the System», i.e. the section of Islam which agreed to become an instrument for certain Western forces' strategy of «the Big Game» «the Big Elite» plays.

The subjects of the article’s concluding part are the modernization of the Soviet industry over the 50s and 60s and the subsequent events which brought about its structural crisis. It is noted that this modernization marked one of the most successful periods of the Soviet economy development. Peculiarities of the Soviet world-economy and the peculiar forms of maintenance of its structural and technological balance are demonstrated. According to the author, the reason for the Soviet industrial system’s structural crisis is the conflict between attempts to maintain high rates of the Soviet world-economy's structural core development and maintenance of the structural and technological frameworks for the economic growth. The author emphasizes that this conflict emerged due to competition with the West which went along in the military as well as in the consumption spheres.

The East-European change of regime found his ideological legitimation in the identification of fascism and «communism» in which the main discourse of this epoch concentrated. In the centre of this ideological legitimation there stands the Auschwitz-Gulag analogy. The author shows the political and ideological motivations, function and arguments of the newly actualised analogy of «AUSCHWITZ AND THE GULAG». The origin of this analogy was determined by the political aims of different political forces in the period of Cold war. After the change of regimes the identification of AUSCHWITZ AND THE GULAG became a rightist-conservative «narrative» in the historiography and in the streamline official political discourse. The function of this identification is to push out to the periphery of existence the system-critical thinking and movements as «extremes». The totalitarianism as a «theory» today has only one function in the historiography: the total criminalization of the history of the Soviet Union and «Communism» (see for example: «The Black Book of Communism»). The author shows that Auschwitz (Endlösung) and Gulag had different reasons and different aims, and also that to deny these differences means the historical relativization of the Endlösung. The author argues for the depolitization of this subject, which means to take seriously the archival research and scientific elaboration.

The article focuses on the formation of basic trends in Russian foreign policy under Peter I and Catherine II. In the author’s view, the spectacular rise of Russia from a negligible international entity at the end of the 17th century to a great power status by the close of the 18th century was due not as much to objective factors as to personal qualities of Russian rulers. Only those who proved capable of conceptual thinking and of imposing their will on others managed both to secure the country’s vital interests through territorial gains and to obtain a prestigious role of Europe’s balance-holder.

The article deals with the creation and activities of the «Holy retinue» which was the secret organization of the court Russian aristocracy. According to the conventional story, its aim was to defend the Emperor’s family and to fight «revolutionary false doctrines». However, the analysis of this body’s activities and prospects set forth by the body’s members demonstrates that in fact the body was set up to carry out the political control over the secret services. The author points out the similarity of the «Holy retinue» and the ideological counterintelligence inside the KGB of the USSR. The author thinks that the issues he raised in respect of the «Holy retinue» history, relationships between the KGB and the Soviet Communist Party’s elite cannot but be a subject of interest for the contemporary Russian politicians.

Herewith is digest of confidential meeting of the Council on Forein Relations (USA, New York City), July, 15, 1940 with count Carlo Sforza’s report on the last days of the Third Republic in France. The principal point of the eyewitness review of the generally known Italian politician and diplomat sounded like that: the basic reason for the collapse of France in June 1940 is not German tank divisions, Stuka dive bombers or espionage. These weapons assisted in the defeat but they were not fundamental. The real explanation is psychological. In contrast with the First World War (1914—1918) which unified France, the beginning of World War II divided the nation into two camps. It is the existence of these two Frances, Carlo Sforza argues, which more than anything else explains the collapse of the postversailles France. Generally speaking the lower and middle classes regarded Germany as the great enemy and believed in fighting to the bitter end. On the contrary the upper classes were implacably opposed to any kind of war with Germany for they were hipnotized by one danger and only one: Bolshevism. «They would have welcomed a war with Russia any time». That was the most essential Sforza’s account concerning the higher priority interests of the French upper classes during the crucial years of 1939 and 1940. The tragedy of France told by Carlo Sforza brings us to a historical parallel with the breakup of the Soviet Union in the course of which «the Petain syndrome» played almost the decisive role.

In the short essay the author deals with issues related to the urgent measures that are to be taken to come out of the crisis and to promote right tax and budgetary policies, administrative reform and reform of pensions.

The author expresses his deepest concern with disappearance of the Developing humankind’s unity principle. The Yalta system is decaying and the Unity of the world principle, as it was stated by Stalin and F.D.Roosevelt, is following the suit. The manifesto of sustainable development was the direct challenge to the Unity of the world principle. New globalists are interested in a situation within which it would be possible to increase the cash flow irreversibly and only in the single point of the financial space. The financial grip is getting more and more tough and ready for the real global duel. Imitations, diversions are elements of hostilities. A system is the totality of elements integrated by an aim. Aid to the developing countries is not even discussed within framework of the new model of the world organization. The aim is not even declared within this framework. Escape from the aim is tantamount to escape from the Humankind’s unity principle. History is the generator of new aims. However an aim tends to turn into a dead dogma and that leads a system to become a power which impedes and even paralyzes appearance of the new. If a form is getting stiff and starts to kill, not to develop its content, such form should be driven in its proper place.

Adducing rich empirical data the author demonstrates that the central tenet of neo-liberal policy, the proposition that a market economy is able to perform in self- regulating manner is just an illusion. The state regulation is the permanent requirement and only when (and if) the economy is well adjusted it is possible to control pace of growth and rates of inflation. Only under these circumstances an “openness” of economy, i.e. ability of an economy to function in the absence of the state’s protection is possible. A weak economy, if it is “open”, is inevitably becoming a donor for the developed countries.

The article deals with the factors underlying the origin of the so-called Crimean system – the great powers casting which came into being in the wake of Russia`s defeat in mid 1850`s. In contrast to conventional views, the author holds that despite the policy of «receuillment» caused by the Crimean debacle Russia continued to exert a considerable, even if not overwhelming, influence on the international affairs. Since Russia was a major guarantor of the Vienna settlement her self-removal from the European scene after 1856 brought about a series of drastic changes in the continental balance of power. To regain a semblance of order and to save their own interests first France and then Germany were left with no other alternative than to resort to Russian help. In the end it occurred that those who, in 1856, posed as winners failed to create a mechanism to protect theirs gains in Europe and elsewhere. Instead they triggered a radical diplomatic revolution just to regret its unintentional consequences.

“Faith and Reason of Soloviov’s philosophy”, the article by G. Florovski which is published here contains the criticism of V. Soloiov’s religious philosophy. The author who assessed spiritual phenomena with the exceptionally high criteria asserted that Soloviov was a liberal permeated with the utilitarianism of 1860s. As the author insists, liberalism is intolerable in a theologian. The author admitted unquestionable merits of Soloviov including Soloviov’s success in making religious themes worthy of discussion, in arousing religious sentiments and in rehabilitating Christianity from accusations of political and social reaction. The author emphasized that the further development of the Russian philosophy was possible not along Soloviov’s lines but along the lines that would mean overcoming Soloviov’s positions.

The author records the principal events of A.N.Kosyghin’s life. Particular attention is given to reforms of the economic mechanism started in 1965 under Kosyghin’s leadership. These reforms included improvement of the defense industries’ management, management of industries and construction management, planning of the national economy and methods of economic activities. The author describes difficulties A. Kosyghin had to overcome in order to introduce the minimum market shifts and self-management into the Socialist environment.

The state in Russia has always been an instrument for realization of a certain universal project. The great power notion is incompatible with the new Russian tradition and culture because there is no link between the statehood and a universal project in these tradition and culture. The author notes that in choosing sides between antagonists of statehood and supporters of statehood whose main plank, patriotism plus globalism is alien to him, he nevertheless takes the side of the latter. The idea of entering the New world order which conquered minds of the overwhelming majority is absolutely suicidal for Russia. A considerable humanistic potential for forced spiritual growth which was accumulated within the Soviet civilization is much needed now for Russia as well as for the whole world and the more so than ever in the past. The author thinks that strengthening of the President’s power vertical is required but he sees no actual steps in the right direction. It is impossible to build the power vertical in a society which lacks verticals of meanings, values, ideas.

In this part of the article the author describes the process of the world economy’s transformation in the neoliberal vein: demise of Bretton-Woods agreements and development of system of characteristics within the Washington consensus as well as the post-Washington consensus program. The author expounds the essence of the neoliberal transformation of economy and shows that the strong economies are affected by these transformations rather mildly and efficiency of such economies can be greatly enhanced due to efforts taken by the state as a regulator of economy. On the contrary, a weak economy is quite vulnerable and if it is entering the neoliberal regime it is susceptible to pressures of the old negative as well as of new negative factors. At the same time all compensatory mechanisms that existed earlier cease to act. Thus the neoliberal model produces only minuses, one of which is a tendency to increase the mass of shadow and criminal economy. The author’s conclusion is that only a regulated mixed economy may be really efficient.

In part II of his article the author dwells at length on consideration of the events which brought about deceleration of the economic reform in the USSR and then to its curtailment and its ultimate suspension. The author also considers the Prime-Minister’s international activities and demonstrates how Kosyghin was gradually driven aside despite his several major achievements. The author notes that Kosyghin’s political and physical demise coincided with the moment when it became clear the Soviet military-mobilization system could not be modernized. The real international rapprochement was over, a new round of the cold war began which the USSR would lose.

The article deals with analysis of the state government ways that were peculiar for V. I. Lenin. The author also considers Lenin’s ideas of the state apparatus’ efficiency. The analysis is based on the correspondence Lenin carried on as the leader of the Soviet government. The analysis demonstrates that Lenin completely disregarded all formal characteristics of the state such as its organization model, functional specialty or level of competence. Lenin understood the state apparatus as a combination of persons distinguished not by their posts or positions within the structure but by their individual abilities. For Lenin, the statesmanship consisted in free manipulation with individuals which was combined with imposing the absolute responsibility for everything on the appointed commissioners extraordinary. At the end of the article the author compares Lenin’s methods of government with the methods peculiar to the present day Russian government.

The author deals with issues related to the current situation and prospects of historical museums’ development in the Russian society as a phenomenon of social, political and cultural life. According to the author, a museum which reproduces models of the past with the help of genuine remnants of the tradition and culture serves not just preservation of the heritage but helps to a critical analysis of the social norms and values and to their authentic reproduction. This fact explains a museum’s bent for rational scientific methods of interpretation of the heritage. That is why a museum is an important vehicle to maintain the historical conscience. The collapse of the Communist ideology brought about disintegration of the Greater Russian national state tradition which crumbled into multitude of particular local archaic traditions that once had been constituent parts of the Greater tradition. The same trend caused disintegration of integral exhibition into array of different ones. The author contends that cognitive assumptions implied in a museum allow to perceive the historical process as a whole.

The author deals with the process of a parliamentary republic making in Moldova and the impact of the process on Moldova's foreign policy including relations with Russia and Transnistria (Dniester Republic) problem. Although the political life of all «post-Soviet space» except the Baltic republics is dominated by the presidential power strengthening, recent changes in Moldova's political system indicate that a parliamentary republic is in making. These changes have caused certain shifts in Moldova's foreign policy: development of relations with the European Union and the initiative of some Moldavian political parties to establish an intergovernmental union with Romania. This policy can undermine the balance of power in the region, system of the Russian regional interests in particular. Russia's policy towards Moldova is focused on the search of balance between president P.Luchinskii, Moldavian Communist party which has the biggest fraction in the Moldavian Parliament, and the government of Dniester Republic. Under new political circumstances the support Russia provides for the single political power in Moldova, the Communist party and its leader P.Voronin is neither effective nor realistic option. The relations between Russia and Transnistria can also become complicated by new political struggle in this Republic. Without the multidimensional approach which takes into due account all players and analysis of new political situation in this region Russia's ability to protect its own interests here will be seriously curtailed.

Even during the Troubled times when Russia experienced a painful and profound crisis, Moscow state tried to maintain contacts with Persia and to protect its interests in the Caucasian region. On his part, the Shah of Persia was looking for chances of rapprochement with Tsars of Moscow, Boris Godunov, Dmitri the False I and Vassily Shuiski. Shah needed their support in his struggle with the empire of Osman Turks. This consideration did not prevent Shah from planning annexation of southern Russian lands at the culmination of the Troubled times. Only restoration of the state and order in Moscow made Shah Abbas I to repudiate such plans and helped to revival of friendly relations between Russia and Persia.

The present day fuss about «the crisis of power» is based on the fundamental incongruence between the content of the political process in Russia and the political language which is used to describe the process. The whole culture of human process is leaned upon the image of a hero who performs extreme efforts. In post-Soviet Russia everything was sold for a convenience. However no life can be constructed on the basis of such sales. The idea of convenience does not generate a convenience. This idea is a by-product of heroic efforts made by somebody. The country may be a place for whatever you may like but not a place for convenience because it is a place for convenience it will become a macroAushwitz. The country is being built not by the Kremlin but by the misfortune. And take note: the making is to be by far more long process then what is going on.

The author considers differences between the classic market economy and the market economy of the neo-liberal type. The author demonstrates that the transition from the system of regulated market economy to the economy of the neo-liberal type did not bring the modern economy any closer to the 19th model. On the contrary, the present day economy is at greater distance from the 19th model. The author points out that the neo-liberal economy is not the economy of growth: it is the economy of redistribution. Due to its inherent properties the neo-liberal economy’s life expectancy is quite limited. The neo-liberal economy is doomed to disappear in 30-40 years. According to estimates, the neo-liberal experiment in 25 years cost 400 trillion dollars to the world economy and 90 trillion dollars to the US economy. These staggering losses have undermined the American economy’s capacity to compete with the East Asian economies, in particular with the economy of China which is the principal systemic competitor to the global neo-liberal market system. The author presents arguments in favor of position according to which the return to a market economy system characteristics of which will be similar to those of Bretton-Woods System era world economy.

The author investigates interrelationships between the types of society development and the political elites formation models. The author proceeds from availability of two paradigms of development: the mobilization paradigm and innovative paradigm. Both paradigms predetermine formation of distinctively different models of elite formation: «bureaucratic» (or «service») one and the «oligarchic» one. Under the mobilization model of development the higher echelon of administrative-political bureaucracy performs the functions normally performed by the political elite while economically dominant groups act as the subject of the innovative development. The author provides, on the basis of the comparative analysis of political development in Russia and the US, a detailed analysis of factors that help to diversify models of development and political forms which correspond to these models. The author points out that the prolonged, in historical terms, period when the mobilization methods of development dominated caused the fact that the model of elite formation which evolved under mobilization development conditions functioned for a long span of the Russian history. In the course of the 1990s social reforms the old «service» principle has been succeeded by the «oligarchic» principle. The contemporary stage of the Russian society development is characterized by a complicated interaction between pluralistically organized political-financial groups and political-administrative bureaucracy.

The problem of historical sources’ interpretation is coming out in the spotlight of the contemporary humanitarian sciences. This is caused by the onward development of theoretical sources’ study which nowadays defines the search for the most correct and unbiased ways of texts interpretation as its principal task. As this is done, the object of historical study is no more the likely past «reality» but an opinion of an author who created the source. So peculiar subject-subjective relationship between a scholar and the «other person’s» conscience fragments of which are embodied in monuments of the past are established. In this case the very historical text comes out in capacity of the singular likely reality which is the most important integral part of the cognitive process. However this position cannot be accepted as a whole with no accompanying reservations. The article is devoted to the theoretical disputes in the contemporary humanitarian sciences.

Theosophy of Charles Baudler, the outstanding French poet, comes out in Europe as the most important stage of the neo-romantic conscience making. The article is devoted to the philosophical principles and ethical and aesthetic meaning of Baudler’s works reception in neo-romanticism of the 19th and 20th centuries. The author attempts to find out what did constitute the main regularities of this continuity. The typological affinity of Baudlerianism and the neo-romantic thought as such emerges in result of the creative assimilation of theosophical first principles and aesthetic strategies of Modernism and Post-Modernism related to these first principles. While Modernism recognizes philosophical individualization of a subject, Post-Modernism denies such individualization. That determined the brightest features in the positivist thought of the past century evolution.

The article deals with one of the most tragic events of Nicolas II reign. Khodynka disaster became a menacing warning, but the power did not derive any benefit from the event. The coronation celebrations of 1896 lost any sense. Instead of spiritual unification of the power and the people a monstrous massive self-destruction occurred. One could say that it was a fatal concurrence of circumstances, but it has developed in a prophesy, in a kind of a regularity of history.