The article examines the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet ideological campaigns in 1945-1953. The differences between the church’s approach towards the ideological campaigns in domestic and foreign policy are being identified. It is made a conclusion that in domestic dimension the Russian Orthodox Church participates in mobilization campaigns, while in foreign dimension it was involved both in mobilization and repressive campaigns. The author analyzes the distinctions between the Orthodox and the Soviet lines in such issues, as the construction of communism, the concept of the Soviet patriotism, Stalin’s cult of personality, the antagonization of West and the struggle against colonialism.

The article is devoted to the little-studied aspects of the history of the Great Northern War – the two Braunschweig Congresses (1713–1714, 1719–1721), convened to draw up a peace treaty between the belligerent powers. The initiative belonged to Austria which sought through its undivided mediation to achieve a peace that would meet, above all, the longterm interests of the Holy Roman Empire. These attempts were bitterly opposed by England and France who also claimed the mediation role and had their own views about the post-war European order. The situation was aggravated by sharp contradictions within the camp of Sweden's opponents and their intention to deprive Peter I of the legal reward for his military victories. As a result, the “concert” approach to the problem of a peaceful settlement proposed by Emperor Charles VI was rejected in favor of a series of separate agreements with Stockholm.

Saxony-Poland was most strange Russia`s ally in the Great Northern War. Russo-Polish tensions deeply rooted in history made it hard to imagine the possibility of their cooperation against Sweden. Nevertheless by 1700 they found themselves united in anti-Swedish coalition. The authors of the article assert that the factors which contributed to the emergence of the alliance between Peter the Great and Augustus II were initially charged with destructive potential strong enough to undermine the Northern Alliance long before the Nystadt Congress of 1721.

In the third and final part of the article the authors came to the conclusion that the Russian-Swedish tensions had not played a major role in the origins of the Great Northern War. It was initiated by other states with long-standing claims against Sweden that resulted in permanent conflicts. Although Russia was not going to constantly put up with its lack of access to the Baltic shores and wanted at least to regain its native Northern lands lost to the Swedes in the early 17th century it had to wait patiently until the right time. The propitious moment might have come much later than 1700 if not for the signing of a long-cherished peace treaty with Turkey. This saved tsar Peter from the threat of war which would have made him postpone the revenge over Sweden indefinitely.

This story opens a series of articles devoted to the prehistory of the Great Northern War seen through separate contexts of diplomatic relationships between Russia, on the one hand, and each member of anti-Swedish coalition, on the other. The author starts with a detailed analysis of the intense activity of two consecutive Danish missions in Moscow – one led by Gildebrand von Horn, another by Paul Heins. They did their utmost to seduce tsar Peter by fabulous prospects promised by the future allied victory over the Swedes. He, however, was guided by his own thoughts as to the circumstances that would justify the risk of war against most powerful state in Northern Europe.

It is easy to understand why historians got used to put Peter the Great`s visit to England in 1698 into a wider context of the topic «Russia and Europe». Following in their steps the author of the article adds some subtler details to the discourse. The point is that for all Peter`s affection for Holland it was England that he singled out among other Western countries. The tsar was far from indiscriminate perception of local ways and mores but he found there a lot of things extremely useful for his motherland. As to the English political elite of the time, it looked at him with a mixture of arrogance, curiosity, and admiration. Some of the country`s higher officials did not hesitate to predict that their «strange guest» would leave an incredible trace in world history.

The author of the article continues to investigate the reaction of English political celebrities and public to Peter the Great`s visit to their country. The numerous references to either well-known or little-known facts are accompanied by the implied idea that from a three-century distance these facts might be seen in a different light than that common for many contemporaries and historians. There is, however, a basis for compromise between struggling views of both admirers and detractors of Russian emperor. All of them agree that no matter how cruel or merciful Peter was he deservedly gained his place among the greatest heroes of the world history.

As it might be judged by the title, the article deals with archaic and rather hazy subject, i.e. how the ancient Greek and Roman writers perceived barbarian world around them. But this is not the only thing the article is about. The author makes an attempt to find the roots of what might be named a paradox. The question is: why the people of the civilized Empires, with their highly arrogant and fastidious attitude towards the surrounding "savages", could not resist the temptation to deliriously imitate their ways and mores, turning this primitive stuff into a part of every-day life?

The author focuses on the profound impact the turbulent XXth century had on the destinies of the Caucasus people. In some cases he also tries to cautiously approach the age-old question “what if” when it comes to nowadays developments in the South Caucasus, the former part of the Soviet Union. Whatever the answer, any scholar could feel free to ponder over the future of the Eurasian space in terms of either optimistic or pessimistic scenarios.

The first in the series this article deals with Peter the Great`s diplomacy at the final stage of Russo-Turkish War of 1686–1700. The peace negotiations were to be conducted at Karlowitz between the Holy League (Austria, Venetia, Poland, Russia) and the Sublime Porte to try to reach an uneasy compromise. As the author argues in the opening part of his text, the conflicting interests of the allies seemed obvious enough to make the chances for success slim.

In the second part of the article the author comes to extensively consider the intricate diplomatic play staged at the Karlowitz congress scene. Hobbled by the absence of the tsar`s update instructions Procopius Voznitsin had to improvise at his own risk. But due to long experience and acute intuition Russian delegate contrived to avoid the traps set by his European counterparts.

The third part of the article focuses on the content of Russo-Turkish negotiations at Karlowitz officially started on November 9th 1698. They constantly stumbled at the Porte`s intransigence fueled by the double-standard position of the Austrian, English and Dutch delegates. The discussions centered around the interpretation of the uti possidetis as a basic principle of the Karlowitz congress. While scrutinizing the arguments of each actor the author blames the Turks and their Western supporters for the lack of progress in peace talks.

The fourth part of the article contains the description of the next round of the uncompromising Russo-Turkish talks at Karlowitz. With the immediate prospects still in the haze the opponents tried their utmost to find out the weakest point in each other’s diplomatic defense. Their desperate search for “optimal solution” made the chances for the breakthrough and collapse roughly equal.

By the beginning of December 1697 the participants of the Karlowitz congress had seemed exhausted well enough to come up with some semblance of compromise. But instead they faced a series of new problems to be resolved. Owing to Voznitzin's dexterity in the art of capitalizing on the severe disagreements between his opponents the diplomatic struggle reemerged with the renewed vigor. It resulted in a situation that could turn into reality any outcome hitherto unlikely to happen.

In the conclusive part of the article the author concentrates on the dramatic events which happened during the last ten days of the Karlowitz congress (from the 6-th to 16-th of January 1699). Strange as it may seem this short span of time was charged by tremendous tensions fraught with the failure of the Congress. Quite unexpectedly help came from Procopius Voznitsin who, pressured by the circumstances, chose to give up the role of troublemaker for that of troubleshooter.

Does the Caucasus War belong to the nineteenth century, or, if otherwise, which time could this phenomenon be attributed to? Has this dispute any scholarly importance, or is it just a complex interplay between the nowadays politics and ideology? Is there any methodological sense in retrospective reflections on the alternative routes of Russia-Caucasus history? Let us soberly think over these questions with timid hope to get closer to some feasible solution.

The author is well aware that by trying to immerse the reader into the murky ages of the Caucasus history he embarks upon a risky travel. The overwhelming part of academic knowledge on that subject-matter is doomed to remain either plausible hypothesis or dubious theories. To verify them with absolute correctness seems next to impossible. Nevertheless we are not going to give up hope to have the picture of the past more vivid and trustworthy. Our cautious optimism is based on the belief that historical sources, for all its impressive quantity, have not yet parted with many of its secrets.

The article revisits the image of Sheikh-Mansour one of the most enigmatic figures of the Chechen history, who by the close of the 18-th century, to quote John Baddeley, «dropped, as it were, from the clouds full grown, a warrior, preacher and prophet» to lead the resistance movement against Russia. The mere fact that Mansour gave an armed response to the advent of the Russians serves for many scholars an irresistible temptation to cast him both as a precursor of the 19-th century Caucasus War and a typological predecessor of the renowned Imam Shamyl. The author of this essay argues against what seems to him a far-fetched comparison between the two mountaineers' leaders belonging to different epochs and having different kinds of perception of their political, ideological, and military missions.

The article revisits the image of Sheikh-Mansour one of the most enigmatic figures of the Chechen history, who by the close of the 18-th century, to quote John Baddeley, «dropped, as it were, from the clouds full grown, a warrior, preacher and prophet» to lead the resistance movement against Russia. The mere fact that Mansour gave an armed response to the advent of the Russians serves for many scholars an irresistible temptation to cast him both as a precursor of the 19-th century Caucasus War and a typological predecessor of the renowned Imam Shamyl. The author of this essay argues against what seems to him a far-fetched comparison between the two mountaineers' leaders belonging to different epochs and having different kinds of perception of their political, ideological, and military missions.

The article revisits the image of Sheikh-Mansour one of the most enigmatic figures of the Chechen history, who by the close of the 18-th century, to quote John Baddeley, «dropped, as it were, from the clouds full grown, a warrior, preacher and prophet» to lead the resistance movement against Russia. The mere fact that Mansour gave an armed response to the advent of the Russians serves for many scholars an irresistible temptation to cast him both as a precursor of the 19-th century Caucasus War and a typological predecessor of the renowned Imam Shamyl. The author of this essay argues against what seems to him a far-fetched comparison between the two mountaineers' leaders belonging to different epochs and having different kinds of perception of their political, ideological, and military missions.

The article invites to revisit an extremely elaborate and fascinating history of the mid-18th century Ossetian diplomatic mission to St. Petersburg. Up to nowadays it has remained customary for some scholars to make this subject one of those to illustrate that Russian policy in the Caucasus was an onward march with no ebbs or twists. The author claims to give a broader picture to include both impartial «laws of history» and imperfect human beings doomed to create this very history in their own way.

The last part of the article deals with the crucial point of the history of the Ossetian embassy in St. Petersburg (1751−1752). The negotiations centered around the perspectives of establishing closer relationships between Russia and Ossetia to eventually usher in the era of incorporation of the pivotal North Caucasus region into Russian imperial mould.

This is an article on the teaching and studying of the controversial problems of the North Caucasus history. The author argues that this branch of Russian historiography is going through severe crisis partly due to the demise of Marxist paradigm to be followed by ideological vacuum. He sees the way to overcome it in the post-modernist overarching approach to the issues sensitive to non-Russian peoples on the one hand, and in ridding of powerful myths firmly established in nationalistic-oriented consciousness, on the other, to develop broader vision of the past.

This article is written in memory of Reginald Zelnik (1936−2004), former professor of history at the University of California (Berkeley). Distinguished specialist in Russian studies, he was highly respected by his colleagues and friends both in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia for his innovative approach to the many aspects of the Russian labor movement. Having still retained their pioneering spirit Zelnik`s works keep inspiring scholars in their attempts to penetrate into the depth of the most controversial problems of Russian social developments after 1861.

The article raises the problem of freezing inflammable trends in the North Caucasus through administrative reforms. These reforms, as the author thinks, should be centered around the formation of a functional mechanism to secure gradual replacement of the aging ethnocratical elites by a new generation of broadly educated political leaders with wider commitments.

The author argues that the destruction of the USSR was not an unavoidable outcome. In 1980's the Soviet political, social and economic system confronted general crisis very similar to the one that shook the West in early and late 1970's. In both cases the crucial developments of the time reflected a certain stage in the evolution of either system. It was not a lethal diagnosis meted out by destiny. Rather it was a big challenge to be answered by politicians and society. The Soviet Union could have survived had «all the king’s men» been guided by the sense of reality and responsibility with some admixture of good fortune.

The article describes the basic motives underlying St. Petersburg government`s decision to incorporate Georgia into the Russian Empire in 1801. The author suggests that Georgian kings Irakli II and Giorgi XII had no other way to save the nation from impending catastrophe than to subject the kingdom to Russian imperial throne. By taking Georgia under her protection Russia inadvertently challenged traditional interests of Iran and Turkey in Transcaucasia. The early XIX century developments in the region were complicated by ever growing British and French presence in Iranian politics. Eventually the building tension resulted in an open clash between Russia and Iran to be subsequently followed by more pronounced involvement of all powers concerned.

As a sequel to the previous part of the article this one covers a period from 1833 to the eve of the Crimean war. Unlike many historians, the author treats the international developments of the time as a non-lineal and disparate process. He holds that there was nothing fatal for the cause of European peace in the chain of events that happened in the 1830's and 1840's. Both Eastern crises and continental revolutions failed to provoke a general war, whereas a relatively minor dispute over «holy places» in early 1850's unexpectedly erupted in a European conflagration. In the author’s view, this outcome deserves to be called a historical enigma rather than a logical result of proceeding circumstances.

The article analyses both the objective and subjective factors accountable for «the long peace» in Europe from 1815 to 1853. Most important among them was not only the Vienna Settlement per se but also the ability of the Great Powers' rules to implement it. As author contends, the leading role in maintenance of European stability which was threatened by the social revolution and the Eastern question belonged, in the long run, to «Russian policemen» Alexander I and Nicholas I since it was Russia that obtained in the aftermath of the 1815 the best position, in terms of power politics, to curb extremely destructive developments on the international arena.

The article contains a specific vision of Russian foreign policy history based on the analysis of the major underlying factor which determined its course — i.e. the problem of nation’s security. The author contends that for Kievan Rus, Moscovy, and, to a lesser extent, imperial Russia geopolitical expansion proved to be an inevitable reaction to the many threats the outside world posed to the nation’s mere existence. This «offensive» mode of survival was complemented by versatile diplomatic strategies aimed at pursuing Russia’s vital interests through a full-fledged participation in international relations both in Europe and Asia. It was nothing else than imperial state structure that provided the Tsars with most effective material and moral instruments to handle the country’s defense issues.

The article is focused on the role of Alexander I of Russia in shaping the European order in the aftermath of the Vienna Congress. The author argues that Europe owed a spectacular period of «long peace» from 1815 to 1853 largely to Russian emperor`s views on international politics and his dogged persistence in implementing them whatever the adds against him. His idealistic concept of the Holy Alliance, which aroused so much criticism among contemporaries and historians, ultimately proved to be quite effective an instrument of staving off a major conflagration on the continent.

Peter the Great’s death left Russia with no rulers to match him. Nonetheless, his successors proved to be smart enough to realize the necessity of keeping Russia allied with great European powers. This helped secure the means to pursue St. Petersburg’s basic international goals. A young player in the world game of power politics, Russia still managed to adroitly capitalize on Franco-Austrian rivalry on the continent, and Franco-British antagonisms outside Europe. Consequently, she succeeded not only in preserving the Peter’s legacy, but also in setting the stage for herself to become one of the major architects of the new international order which comprised the fundamental components destined to survive through most of the XIX-th century.

The article focuses on the formation of basic trends in Russian foreign policy under Peter I and Catherine II. In the author’s view, the spectacular rise of Russia from a negligible international entity at the end of the 17th century to a great power status by the close of the 18th century was due not as much to objective factors as to personal qualities of Russian rulers. Only those who proved capable of conceptual thinking and of imposing their will on others managed both to secure the country’s vital interests through territorial gains and to obtain a prestigious role of Europe’s balance-holder.

The article deals with the factors underlying the origin of the so-called Crimean system – the great powers casting which came into being in the wake of Russia`s defeat in mid 1850`s. In contrast to conventional views, the author holds that despite the policy of «receuillment» caused by the Crimean debacle Russia continued to exert a considerable, even if not overwhelming, influence on the international affairs. Since Russia was a major guarantor of the Vienna settlement her self-removal from the European scene after 1856 brought about a series of drastic changes in the continental balance of power. To regain a semblance of order and to save their own interests first France and then Germany were left with no other alternative than to resort to Russian help. In the end it occurred that those who, in 1856, posed as winners failed to create a mechanism to protect theirs gains in Europe and elsewhere. Instead they triggered a radical diplomatic revolution just to regret its unintentional consequences.