The publication presents new documentary evidence from the papers of the Council on Foreign Relations and Allen Dulles’s personal papers at Princeton University which pictures Dulles in 1944–1946 as a sober and pragmatic foreign policy expert quite different from the popular image of a rabid Cold Warrior bent on destruction of the Soviet Union from the end of World War II onwards. In fact Allen Dulles of that time was still in favor of finding some modus vivendi with the USSR based on mutual recognition of spheres of influence. He distanced himself from the Cold War hawks and proposed some practical ways of post-war settlement. These documents demonstrate that Dulles’s views had undergone some evolution before he became one of the main organizers of covert war against the Soviet Union as a Director of Central Intelligence Agency in 1950-s.

The documentary essay explores the less-known circumstances surrounding the famous Fulton speech by W.Churchill. It is based on the British archival sources, first of all – reports from the British Embassy in Washington on Churchill’s visit to the United States and on American public reaction to the Fulton speech. It demonstrates that the initial response was very mixed which pushed Churchill to change emphasis in his subsequent speeches in the U.S. But ultimately, as concluded by the author, the “iron curtain” speech contributed to the shift of American public to the cold war mode.

The article deals with a little-known episode of Soviet-American relations in the end of World War II. It analyses a diplomatic struggle over adherence to Yalta agreements on Far East with an emphasis on Kurile islands. Using new documents from American military and diplomatic archives the author traces the origins of President Truman’s request for basing rights on Kuriles expressed in his August 18 message to Stalin. It is demonstrated that far from being an isolated improvisation it was a culmination of a long process of U.S. attempts to penetrate strategically important Kuriles.

The publication is devoted to estimates of Soviet strategic interests produced by the British intelligence toward the end of WWII. These documents from Britain’s National Archives are primarily interesting because of their fairly objective and comprehensive analysis of Soviet postwar security requirements and a rather accurate forecast of future Soviet policy in pursuit of those interests. The Soviet sphere of influence as outlined in these estimates is quite close to and sometimes even exceeds the actual geopolitical requests made by Stalin by the end of WWII. This implicit recognition of legitimacy of the Soviet geopolitical desiderata contradicts the conventional thesis that the Soviet Union after the war went far beyond its legitimate security interests and thus provoked the Cold War with the West.

The article based on new documents from American archives illuminates a little-known episode of the Cold War history connected with a courageous struggle of a prominent physicist Leo Szilard to remove the threat of war and stop the nuclear arms race. It describes the story of his «Open letter» to I. Stalin of late 1947, that was preceded by internal fights among academic community and government bureaucracy. The letter itself is being published for the first time in Russia with necessary comments and background. The story of this document presents a vivid example of a collision between one of the earliest proponents of the new thinking with inertia of the Cold War policy and bureaucracy on both sides of the iron curtain.

What the World War II and the Great Patriotic War was about? Who was its main instigator and the source of danger? Which side was the truth on? These questions, which seemed to have been resolved once and for all, are being raised again by journalists, historians and politicians who try to replace labels of good and evil from some countries to other. That is why it may be instructive to go back to how the essence of this great struggle was perceived by its immediate participants in 1945. The most convincing evidence of Western allies' true feelings by the end of the war are American intelligence and diplomatic reports on a situation in a liberated Germany, discovered by the author in the U.S.National Archives. Of special interest are reports of summer 1945 interrogation of the top Nazi leaders which American high command never shared with its Soviet ally.

How did the U.S. diplomacy, intelligence and propaganda deal with the end of American atomic monopoly in 1949 — a development of major historical significance foreshadowing an emergence of a bipolar world? Using new primary sources from American and Russian archives the author addresses this question by first exploring the policies of both sides leading to this event: American build up and intelligence estimates of Soviet atomic program as well as the Kremlin’s diplomatic and propagandistic cover up of its efforts to catch up with the U.S. in atomic arms race. The article also deals with an impact of Soviet atomic bomb on the U.S. policy and strategy with the main emphasis on American government’s perception of the new Soviet challenge and it implications for both Soviet and the U.S. policies. The author contends that despite some penetrating insights into the future responsible behavior of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power, the «worst case» logic of American military and political planners led to further escalation of nuclear arms race which reached it next crossroad only by 1970-s

The publication of little known working notes on background of Yalta conference by Charles E.Bohlen - a prominent American diplomat of 1940-1960-s and an active participant of Yalta proceedings sheds new light on the old debate about Franklin D.Roosevelt policy toward the Soviet Union. Was Yalta an honest mistake, a betrayal of American interests, or a realistic compromise? Which side was primarily responsible for Yalta's unfulfilled promise? Bohlen's case for FDR's realism, while quite convincing in some respects, goes too far in absolving the US from any responsibility for the collapse of the Grand Alliance. Yalta's ambiguous legacy remains an important lesson for future American-Russian relations.