Analyzing the key problems of the Russian political process (a possible position of Russia in the contemporary world, politicians' striving for a personal success absolutely separated from the social result of politicians' activities, confrontations among the elite corporations, Chechnya war issue, threat posed by the terrorist Islam, the power's attempts to change control of the elite for surprise assaults upon the elite groups), the author demonstrates that the Russian authorities still lack an understanding of the realistic strategy and aims, i. e., the power in Russia still lacks qualities intrinsic to any power subject. Being unable to mobilize the society for enhancement of its own might the power erroneously suppose that the social inertness and the opposition's weakness ensure security of the power. Moreover, the power tries to control by applying pressure against its enfeebled opponents. But this kind of pressure throws the opposition in the enemies of Russia arms, makes the social and elite consolidation impossible and weakens the power even more. The state without the society is dead. And we have to undertake whatever we can to change this situation.

The author examines logic and mechanisms employed in the course of the Soviet industrial system's two modernizations which were undertaken in 1930s and in 1950-1960s. The first modernization represented the economic component of a peculiar supernational social macro-project which integrated values of the Soviet society and was a response to the crisis of the Western civilization model. The second modernization provided for adaptation of the Soviet industrial system to new conditions of the Soviet society development which emerged in the post- WWII period. The examination is carried from interdisciplinary positions. The conventional economic analysis is strengthened with examination of social and cultural dimensions of the Soviet modernization and of the structure of the Soviet world economy etc. The model of the Soviet industrial system which resulted from the two modernizations up to 1970s provided for dynamic economic growth within which the standards of living visibly improved, large scale defensive programs were initiated and developed and manufacturing was being switched to new generations of technologies. The same model predetermined the limits of evolutionary self-development of the Soviet industrial system as regards aims and targets of the self-development and the systemic resources employed.

Large-scale changes in a state and a society always put the problem of relationship between the secular and spiritual authorities. That is why the confrontation between Patriarch Nikon and Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich was not an accident. "Case of Nikon" was a way to resolve the problem of the two authorities' co-existence in the period of the absolute monarchy making. That way was a very painful one but it to a great extent predetermined "no conflict" scenarios of subsequent confrontations between the secular and Church authorities.

The publication of little known working notes on background of Yalta conference by Charles E.Bohlen - a prominent American diplomat of 1940-1960-s and an active participant of Yalta proceedings sheds new light on the old debate about Franklin D.Roosevelt policy toward the Soviet Union. Was Yalta an honest mistake, a betrayal of American interests, or a realistic compromise? Which side was primarily responsible for Yalta's unfulfilled promise? Bohlen's case for FDR's realism, while quite convincing in some respects, goes too far in absolving the US from any responsibility for the collapse of the Grand Alliance. Yalta's ambiguous legacy remains an important lesson for future American-Russian relations.

The author asserts that standards of justice are prerequisite for survival of the Russians and normal existence of any society. In some fundamental sense, all the Russians need is the restoration of the very notion of justice. Events of the past 15 years, the miserable results of these events and the current deplorable situation which seems to be hopeless are caused by apostasy from the principle of justice which has been effectively corrupted by the Soviet and post-Soviet elite.

The author examines the version that the "voluntary yet compulsory" resettlement of Jews who, due to I.V.Stalin's order, were planned to be moved from the European part of the USSR to distant parts of Siberia and Far East. This version has been widely spread in the literature for several decades. Principal components of this version, sources on which it is based and queries it raises are summed up. The attention is focused on discussion of this problem at the international symposium "The late Stalinism and the Jewish question" which was held in June, 1998, at Eistatt Catholic University, FRG. Arguments and counterarguments adduced in presentations of G.V.Kostyrchenko and V.P.Naumov, the Russian participants of the symposium. The author draws the conclusion that both parties of this protracted dispute have solid arguments as well as less convincing ones. According to the author, the question put in the title of this article cannot be answered unequivocally as yet. The facts given in the postscriptum and ascertained after the symposium confirm this conclusion.