The article deals with the policy of the Russian Federation towards Chechnya in 1994. The Russian-Chechen negotiations reached an impasse. Moscow categorically refused to recognize the independence of Chechnya, as D.Dudaev insisted. In the spring of 1994, the Kremlin actually refused to consider him the legitimate president of Chechnya. In the summer of 1994, taking advantage of the deepening internal political crisis in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to use the policy of the "half-power option". Its essence was the overthrow of Dudaev by the forces of the Chechen opposition, which relied on the help of Russia. In November 1994 this policy has completely failed. The Russian-Chechen negotiations in early December 1994 ended in failure, after which it was decided to conduct a full-scale military operation against Dudayev.

The article analyzes the relationship between the state authorities of the Russian Federation and the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 1996–1999. After the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements, the federal center hoped to peacefully establish relations with the Chechen authorities and promote the economic and political integration of Chechnya into the Russian constitutional space. In the first half of 1997, the relations between the official Moscow and Grozny were quite constructive. However, then the Chechen authorities began to rigidly insist on granting the republic full independence, sabotaged all the agreements reached on economic issues, and indulged religious extremists. As a result, in 1998 the negotiation process reached an impasse. Attempts to resuscitate him at the end of 1998–1999 were unsuccessful, and in the autumn of 1999 an armed conflict began again in Chechnya.

The article reviews the political development of the Chechen Republic while A.-Kh. A. Kadyrov was in power. The author analyzes the internal political situation in the republic, the process of forming state authorities, the relationship between the military and civilian authorities in Chechnya. The political process in Chechnya took place in extremely difficult conditions due to the acute socio-economic crisis and the ongoing armed confrontation between the federal center and the separatists. A.-X. Kadyrov pursued a course towards building constructive relations with the federal center. A key event was the referendum in March 2003, which consolidated Chechnya's status as a subject of Russia and the presidential elections in October 2003. The death of the Chechen president in May 2004 was a resonant event, but could not change the vector of political development of the republic.

The article analyzes the prerequisites and consequences of the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements on August 31, 1996 between the Russian Federation and Chechen separatists. By the summer of 1996, the war in Chechnya had reached an impasse, Russian troops were unable to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and gradually lost their strategic initiative. The capture of Grozny by Chechen militants demonstrated the obvious weakness of the federal forces and forced the Russian authorities to make serious concessions. The signing of Agreements, which represented a well-known compromise, made it possible to end the fighting and “ freeze” the conflict. However, the parties were unable to create an effective mechanism for their implementation, which did not allow the conflict between the federal Center and the Chechen Republic to be finally resolved at that time.

One of the priorities of the federal Center's policy in the first half of the 1990s was the search for effective ways to build relations with the Russian regions. This process was most difficult in Chechnya, where supporters of the republic's secession from the Russian Federation came to power in 1991. During 1992–1994, the parties tried to agree on mutual interests, but the negotiation process for various reasons often came to an impasse. In 1994, the federal Center set a course to curtail contacts with the Chechen authorities and support the anti-Dudayev opposition. The negotiation process, which resumed at the end of 1994, did not lead to positive results. It seems, however, that the possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the crisis were not fully exploited by both sides, which turned into a tragedy for the entire country.

In article, the author considers relationship between the leader of the White movement in the south of Russia general A.I.Denikin and the government of the self-proclaimed Mountain Republic at the beginning of 1919. White refused to recognize sovereignty of the Mountain Republic but guaranteed them broad internal self-government. The Mountain Government insisted on recognition of independence and non-interference to internal affairs of the republic. Parties did not succeed to reach a compromise, and negotiation process came to a standstill. In May 1919, the Volunteer Army liquidated the Mountain Republic. It was tactical success of White Guards, however strategically they considerably weakened their positions, having involved in the wearisome armed opposition with the Caucasian mountaineers.

The article devotes to the questions of formation of the Caucasian statehood during the Russian revolution and Civil war of 1917–1921. Desintegration of the Russian Empire has led to aggravation of a political and social and economic situation in the North Caucasus, at the same time, the various political forces moved forward the projects of association of all people of the Caucasus and creation of uniform state education. The author analyzes various models of statehood which tried to introduce both local, and all-Russian political forces in the North Caucasus and the reasons of a failure of similar attempts; explores the place and a role of national movements of the people of the Caucasus in the context of the national and state construction in post-revolutionary Russia.