If one gets understanding of the objective laws that govern social processes one gains an ability to predict the character of some macrosocial trend. The author deals with the gloom tendency which manifests itself in the outrageous disregard of the historical memory whether it is related to the Great Patriotic War of 1941−1945 or to the Battle on Kulikovo field which recently has become the favorite target of those who attacks the historical memory with particular vehemence. The author indicates that this deplorable tendency is connected, first and foremost, to activities of the Eurasians: Doughin, Hukhaev, Yakhimchik et al. Activities of these persons is aimed at destruction of Russia and correspond to ideas of Brzezinski. «Eurasia» movement presided by Doughin is, in fact, the horse of Troy which some forces are going to employ in order to make a loose conglomeration of the centralized Russian state. That is why President Putin’s state-consolidating activities are so important for the country. At the same time the author argues that the support of the patriotic electorate is the most important for Putin.

The crisis of 1990s attracted the attention of many Russian economists to the problems of economic security. Now we have a vast body of literature on this topic. However, there remain important problems of a conceptual nature: alternative definitions of the economic security are often contradictory, analytical instruments are quite vague, whereas the range of phenomena considered as belonging to the sphere of economic security tends to expand ad infinitum (from the questions of the planetary scope to the personnel management practices at the enterprise level). In the recent article, we survey competing approaches to the economic security based on its understanding in terms of national or public interest, economic stability, and economic independence. It is argued that the definition in terms of stability of national and international economic systems allows one to evade various conceptual difficulties peculiar to the alternative definitions, at the same time providing an opportunity to analyze important practical issues. We interpret threats to the national economic security as endogenous and exogenous shocks of economic and political origin leading to the destabilization of the national economy, and use this approach to describe major problems facing the economy of post-communist Russia.

The author doubts whether the persons who define economic policies of the Russian cabinets since early 1990s up to now are monetarists. The real economic policies of these cabinets (and their monetary policies in particular) obviously contradict the basic tenets of monetarism and logic of the doctrine, in fact negate them. From this fact one should not come to a conclusion that policies of the Russian «monetarists» are void of any meaning. On the contrary, these policies have quite definite meaning and are consistent. The essence and the intention of these policies are the irreversible destruction of Russia. And inflation serves as an instrument (and quite effective one) to achieve the goal.

The author investigates the version about the «preventive» nature of German attack on the USSR in 1941. Recently the version has gained a considerable popularity in historical literature and in mass media. On the basis of numerous facts and documents the author demonstrates that the Kremlin had no intention to attack Germany and in the case of war the combat capabilities of the Red Army did not allow to achieve a success in a massive strategic offensive against the Wehrmacht which was the world’s strongest army at the time. The author argues that the Soviet failures at the beginning of the war were due to the inadequate appraisal of the international situation by the Soviet political leaders, miscalculations of the Red Army high commanders, their misjudgments about the nature of the forthcoming war and the foe’s strength. Underdevelopment of the USSR which just recently had taken the path of industrialization and still lagged behind the developed capitalist states also had its negative impact on the preparation of the USSR.

On the basis of the German documents the author examines the special operation of the Hitlerite secret services aimed at misinformation of the USSR political leadership and military high command in regard of Germany’s military and political intentions on 1941 and possible terms of the German attack against the USSR. The author investigates various options of misinformation and methods of misleading and offers an answer to the question why did the Soviet leaders were so slow with giving the order to the along the border military districts' troops to get ready for combat.

Contacts of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian intelligence services in 1940−41 constitute an absolutely unknown to the Russian readers chapter of the Soviet intelligence services and the Soviet-Czechoslovakian relations history. The cooperation of thew Soviet and Czechoslovakian intelligence services began to develop quite successfully after Czechoslovakian recognized the USSR de-jure in 1935. This cooperation was interrupted after occupation of the Czech lands by Nazi Germany in March, 1939, and conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact in August, 1939. However, restoration of this cooperation began since summer of 1940. Secret negotiations were held in Prague, London, Bucharest, Istanbul and then in Moscow. The negotiations were held when no official Soviet-Czechoslovakian relations existed and were kept in secret from London and Berlin. The negotiations' significance lies in the fact that they, undoubtedly, helped to restore and mend the Soviet-Czechoslovakian cooperation after beginning of Nazi Germany aggression against the USSR and paved the way for Czechoslovakian-Soviet agreement signing on July 18, 1941, and for formation of the Czechoslovakian military unit on the territory of the USSR.

The author analyzes reasons for popularity of the theory advanced by L. Goumiliov who suggested that every ethnic group at some early stage of its development is motivated by and is driven by an ability to suppress the instinct of self-preservation in order to achieve some aim which sometimes may be a quite illusionary one. Besides analysis of reasons for the theory’s popularity the author provides a survey of possible theoretical sources which the theory may have in the humanitarian thought. The author also discusses the mutually single-valued correspondence between the «passion-like» movement of a society and an individual who has psychological inclination and striving for such movement. Thus, Goumiliov provided a straight answer to the question put by the best minds of the humankind. Among the Western spiritual predecessors of Gumiliov the author points out Hume, Schweizer, Bergson and Nitsche while Tolstoi, Dostoevski, Rozanov and Veresaev are mentioned among Goumiliov’s Russian predecessors. Goumiliov’s theory is meticulously compared to M. Weber's theory of charizma. The author comes to the principal conclusion: Goumiliov’s theory is irrefutable for it belongs to historiosophy and it can be applied when appropriate or it can be ignored altogether.