Interview given by S.E.Kurginyan is devoted to the difficult and ambiguous situation that emerged in Russia on the eve and during elections (December 2011 — March 2012). The complexity of the situation is determined by instability of the national political life and presence of antagonistic trends. Kurginyan is dissatisfied with the liberal course announced by the non-systemic opposition as well as with the authorities' strategy that is doomed to ambiguity. Kurginyan is the mouthpiece of the social request of not just stability of the old line but of a strategic project or paradigm for new Russia, Russia of the counter-modern and counter-elite. In such new paradigm interests of the big state would correspond to interests of the private sector and individuals.

The establishment of young republics in Versailles system of international relations was accompanied by the formation of national armies under the leadership of the French general staff'. In the eastern policy of Pilsudsky the anti-soviet military forces could be allies. After their internment they were placed in Polish camp. Amnestied refugees were under the tutelage of soviet and emigrant structures

The paper is devoted to the eastern dimension of Poland’s foreign policy. The theoretical basis of Poland’s foreign policy is the issue of main concern. Polish role in the expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions is revised when the author examines the historical and theoretical roots of current Polish geopolitical doctrine. The different forms of Jagellonian paradigm in Polish geopolitical thought are studied to explain their manifestation in Poland eastern policy after the 1989. Their origins, theoretical explications and forms of manifestation are described and analyzed. The article reveals their influence on the development of Atlanticist geopolitical vector in modern Poland, describes and explains its eastern policy.

The author considers such multi-valued notion as «intelligentsia» and the corresponding phenomenon of intelligentsia as a specific phenomenon in the social, political and cultural history of the old Russia, the USSR and present-day Russia. The author demonstrates that ambiguity and vagueness, non-terminological character of this notion reflect the real historical situation in which intelligentsia has emerged not so much as an objective entity as an entity that is defined, in the first place, through self-awareness, self-identification and through idea of a special mission. The author considers reasons that determined erosion of intelligentsia in the meaning indicated in the post-Soviet Russia.

The authors runs back the process of political parties genesis in the Russian empire, defines the chronological limits of the process and its stages. The author shows that Russia had a rich experience of political struggle rooted in the very ancient times and supposes that it is inaccurate to maintain that the genesis of Russian parties considerably lagged behind the similar process in the West. The thesis that parties emerged first in the national periphery of the empire is also incorrect. On the contrary, it was the national center (and the imperial capital) that gave examples of party building. Socialist organizations that at the early stages of genesis outraced conservative and liberal formations by pace of development, yet finally completed their emergence later than liberal and conservative parties. That corresponds with the world practice. Having selected formed parties according the characteristics stipulated in the article the author obtains data on parties' memberships that are more modest than data usually mentioned in the historic literature. The selected parties are classified according to territorial-national and doctrinal criteria.

The issues concerning sources of information about events in the Far East and the attitude of peasantry towards these events are discussed in the article. The war affected peasantry by way of conscription of reservists and recruits. It was not the war that was the initial cause of hardships of the rural population, but it did aggravate socio-economic problems. Information about Russia-Japan war basically reached peasants through popular prints and verbal communications. The latter were of two kinds — pro-Government (disseminated through clergy) and anti-Government (spread by «intelligent people»). Peasants displayed certain interest towards war events, but this interest was of negative nature. They criticized and refuted existent rules, called upon reservists and recruits not to go for a war and appealed to their fellow villagers to avoid any war donations, to refuse paying duties and taxes. Part of them collaborated with revolutionary propagandists and agitators. The revolution, that ensued, sent the unsuccessful war into shadows, and peace agreement did not help to pacify the people.

It is the first publication of the full text of the letter sent by former Czar general K.L.Ghil'chevski to M.I.Kalinin. The reasons for writing the letter were cares about the pension. However the letter content is not confined to these cares. Ghil’chevski expounds his own biography emphasizing the fact that during the revolution of 1905 he refused to take part in punitive operations and during the Civil war he did not go to serve under A.I.Denikin. The ex-general analyzes the Soviet system uncompromisingly, sometimes on the verge of anti-Soviet appreciations. Ghil’chevski also emphasizes his commitment to patriotism. The letter caused a response and Ghil’chevski’s manuscript that summarized his battle experience during the World War I was published in the USSR as a single volume.