The article deals with the burning issues of terrorism and Islamic extremism which are the main threat for the whole humanity today. This danger causes the growing alarm in the world society and that’s why needs thorough analyses of their reasons. That’s why in the article the author thoroughly investigates the growth of terrorist threats, their reasons and why the terrorism and Islamic extremism are especially dangerous. In this context considered the problems connected with the adopting of the decisions by the different international organizations on common struggle with terrorism. Using system and holistic analyses the author who was the ambassador at large and the director of the Middle East department in the USSR Foreign Ministry researchts the possible ways and methods of struggle with terrorism.

The article is devoted to description and estimates of the situation why and how N.S.Khrushchev had made the decision to begin nuclear disarmament starting wit the nuclear test ban. Simultaneously the author analyses the reaction of Washington on this Soviet decision. Mutual suspicions were very high at that time but nevertheless the first negotiations had started in Geneva where not only diplomats but famous nuclear scientists were participated. This was the first step to nuclear disarmament. The author who was the witness of these events writing in details and making a systematic and holistic analysis why and how it had happened.

In June 1961 at the first meeting of N.S.Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy in Vienna there were real possibilities to start with a nuclear test ban agreement in order to begin the lessening of international tension and solving the Berlin crises. But instead of the concrete discussions of these urgent problems the leaders of the two superpowers were involved in general talks with no attempts to solve them. The result of the Vienna summit was the decision in the Kremlin to brake the moratorium, to start nuclear tests, making the most powerful explosion at Novaya Zemlya proving ground. The author who was the witness of these events writing in detail and making a systematic and holistic analysis why and how it had happened.

The situation with the European security is one of the most acute problems in world politics today. Мany European leaders declare about constructing the new Europe that is based on juridically obligatory agreements. This reminds in many ways the 20-years old statements, when an attempt was made to build such a Europe in Paris 1989. The base of that Europe had to be the CFE Treaty, the European Security Treaty and a new agreement on CSBM’s. The author who participated in those negotiations undertakes a systematic and holistic analysis on how this base was build at that time. The readers of the article can themselves make conclusions on the result of the Paris summit.

The early 1980s were among the most volatile years in Soviet — US relations. They might be equated with the early 1960s, the era of the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. The international tensions were greatly intensifying, and once again the world could have come on the brink of war. This occurred not because war was desired and prepared for by the leaders of both superpowers, but because, not knowing and understanding one another, they suspected the worst of each other’s intentions. The author who was at that years the director of the Middle East department in the USSR Foreign Ministry and the Head of the Soviet delegation on the Stockholm Conference on European Disarmament thereupon, undertakes a systematic and holistic analysis of that situation.

The latest year of the USSR existence began with the crises not only in the domestic and economic policies but in the foreign policy also. Two critical situations were before Moscow: The reaction to growing unrest in Lithuania and other Baltic states which threatened the existence of the Soviet Union, and the reaction to the American invasion in Iraq which betokened loses of Soviet supports in the Middle East region. Making a systematic and holistic analysis the author shows well-founded that the Soviet leadership didn’t have distinct strategic goals and tactic what to do in this situation.

The situation with the ABM is one of the most acute problems in the Russian -American relations to day. And we collide here with a historical paradox: Heading for a creation of an ABM system the USA to day are wiring for sound the former Soviet position, and Russia, which are against this US policy is taking in reality the former position of the USA. The author who was one of the participants who had made the ABM Treaty examines this situation and tells how compromise was found and the ABM Treaty was concluded in 1972 in spite of the fundamental differences in the positions of the sides. He undertakes also a systematic and holistic analysis of the present situation and comes to the conclusion that compromise is also possible now so far as the sides have the common interest in the counteraction to terrorism and Islamic extremism. And he writes what might be this compromise.

The breakthrough happened in January 1990 when it had became clear that unification of Germany advanced on the first place in European and world politics. In hot discussions in Washington and European capitals the fate of Germany was closely tied with the presence of Soviet and American troops in Central Europe. These discussions were held in the Kremlin also but they have not appeared on the surface. What was the result of these discussions and what decisions were made are thoroughly analized by the author who was the ambassador and the head of the Soviet delegation on the CFE Treaty negotiations in Viena at that time.

In the last part of the article the author shows based on the facts that the Soviet Union had started the negotiation on unification of Germany without distinct strategic goal where to lead the matters and without well thought-out tactics how to lead them. At that time we could secure our interests very seriously, but nothing had been done for that. We just swallowed an assurance made at the very beginning of the diplomatic bargaining that NATO would not move to the East on an inch and had been rested on that. But the recently declassified documents shows, that the USA and Europe were ready for very serious search of compromises as to entering of unified Germany into NATO and to further NATO expansion to the East as well.

In the second part of this article the author explores the negotiations in Moscow between Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and the State Secretary James Baker in February 1990. And these negotiations had become the real turning point in history of German unification. Three main problems were discussed than in Moscow: — On what conditions it is possible to have German unification. — It will be neutral or in NATO after unification. — Who and how will conduct these negotiations. But it turned out, that the Soviet leadership had not have the clear position on these problems and was ready to adopt the Western positions. Baker had come to conclusion that Gorbachev would agree on unification of Germany without any serious political conditions. More over, he will agree on its membership in NATO. And Baker promised that NATO would not move its military presence on the territory of East Germany. These positions Gorbachev had confirmed in several days to the West German chancellor Kohl and Kohl called their meeting «the grate day for Germany».

How Germany unification had started and what was the policy of the Soviet Union? These questions are being raised again and again by historians, journalists and common people. The author, who was at that time the Soviet ambassador and the USSR representative at the Viena negotiations on European security and reduction of the conventional armed forces in Europe, gives the answers on these questions based on his diaries of that time and new Soviet and Western declassified documents. The essay, based on facts, discovers illusions, which existed in this autumn of 1989 both in Soviet and Western leadership, that the German unification was not the reality in the near future. And only after the fall of the Berlin Wall both Moscow and Western capitals began to understand that Germany unification had bursted literally into the agenda of World politics. The author describes in details how these approaching problems of Germany unification were discussed in the Kremlin. This late recovery of sight, duality of Gorbachev politics, the absence of the strategic line, and the set that the history will decide all these problems in 50−100 years has become the tragedy of the Soviet foreign policy.

In the third part of this article the author explores the negotiations on Malta between Gorbachev and Bush. Not many people remember that meeting to day. But it’s a pity. As on Yalta 45 years before, two leaders of the USSR and the USA had decided on Malta in December 1989 the fate of Germany and of the Eastern Europe, but only in a quite opposite direction. Gorbachev had recognized there the right of any state for a freedom of choice, including the right to reconsider the previous one. The Soviet Union would not use the force, though just a few days before he declared that we had not to lose GDR in no circumstances. This unexpected admission Gorbachev in Malta was taken in Washington as a signal that the road to NATO for unified Germany was opened now without any conditions. More over, the road was opened as well to collapse of Warsaw Pact and to flight of Eastern European countries to the open arms of the West. And the USSR policy was taken as policy of idleness -only to bark, but to do nothing.

What were the mysteries of German unification and how the policy was working out in Moscow and Washington in the end of 1989 when it had become clear that unification was inevitable? The author, who was at that time the Soviet ambassador and the USSR representative at the Viena negotiations on European security and reduction of the conventional armed forces in Europe, gives the answers on these questions based on his diaries of that time and new Soviet and Western declassified documents. The essay based on facts discovers such a picture. By that time the USA and FRG had taken the firm position that the unification was inevitable and as soon as possible. Moreover, the United Germany had to be in NATO. But a disorder prevailed in the Kremlin where different positions were advanced. Gorbachev had chosen the policy of “nothing to do”, obviously not making up his mind to take responsibility on himself and hoping that everything would be settled by history if not in 100 years but in no case during his life. And so he had taken a two –faced position. Depending on his interlocutors he told one that we had not to loose GDR in any case, and to the other that any country had the right to choose its own way.