The situation in Russia is characterized by lack of even an inertial stability for the inertia leads it towards a big bang. However now the president is completely responsible for what is going on. Putin’s strength lies in his vulnerability (consequently, he has to act) while his weakness lies in the fact that he has not acquired the full awareness of his vulnerability as yet. The source of threats to Putin is concealed in the fact that he and the core group he relies on are defined and determined by their affiliation with the KGB. The positively colored expectation is the main content of the masses' attitude to Putin while the elite as a whole hates him. The people do not allow the elite to launch a real onslaught on the president but as the positive expectation will be exhausted a situation of a new quality, i.e. situation of threats' realization will emerge. The first threat proceeds form the parliament: having won a situational victory at the election of December 7, 2003, in the final analysis Putin has suffered a strategic defeat for he has got a Duma able to declare impeachment and modify the Constitution. The second threat lies in the constructed power system’s sheer inability to fight against loyalty: the system is becoming relaxed when it is being licked all around. The third threat lies in the fact that it is pernicious to develop any relationships with the present day regressive «aggregate reality». Hence the need in a revolution from above though there is no support to rely on. The fourth threat is the social protest. Earlier this protest was effectively short-circuited on the CPRF and the opposition in the Duma. Now it is squeezed to the streets and is becoming to be a threat of Putin’s power dismounting. One cannot forget global contradictions that require from the president structures and resources that are simply unavailable today.

The articles deals with the make-up of regional elites in a particular span of time and the dynamics of the extent to which members of these elites exercised influence on the social, political and economic situation in every particular region which has its own, often unique specific characteristics. The article also demonstrates peculiarities of mechanisms that defined formation of regional political and economic elites in terms of influence factors. This approach allows comparing regions with each other on one hand and on the other hand getting the result which is representative for the Russian Federation as a whole. The experts' opinions poll made in the research of 2000 covered 54 regions while the similar poll carried out in 2003 covered 66 regions. The poll of 2003 is not a mere extended repetition of the research of 2000 but its qualitatively new stage. The novelty of the poll made in 2003 lies in the conceptual comprehension of the very mechanisms of influence at the regional level.

Upon redistribution of the «material and technical basis of Communism» it’s high time to redistribute intangible resources of Russia, reconstruct its semantics, secure its long-term strategic orientation, define and privatize its social-cultural fields. The format of post-industrial redistribution implies a greater attention to the intellectual and management resources rather than to mere material wealth of «Russia Inc.». Gradually people are getting to understand relationships among social cultural, political economic and technological aspects of the new statehood construction. Prerequisites for actions in the sphere of value system and semantics of the national statehood that are aimed not at readjustment of its practical mechanics are emerging alongside with the plans for modernization reconstruction. An intriguing probability of appearance of new influential players including some version of an ambitious corporation and political organization of the «new class» also appears. One of the issues often repeated in discussion of the political landscape, and not just by the professional political scientists is the issue of the historical dynamics' vector. Dullness of the Russian political landscape poses the ultimate threat of collapse to the public politics' feeble and unstable political culture and to the very fundamentals of representative democracy. The issue of an alternative political independent agent able to carry out a cultural revolution and to express justified social ambitions in a long run is also debated. One more aspect of the problem is the matrix of social political and cultural construction marked with traits of a post-modernistic performance and pragmatic technologic mentality.

Despite the existing tradition to make use of any ancient text which explains results of archeological research a «new archeology» which negates use of Biblical texts for interpretation of archeological data has appeared within chairs of Israeli universities. Real archeological findings have convinced even those scientists who had been sceptical about the Israeli historical tradition in authenticity of the Biblical text. The «new archeologists» cast doubt on the Biblical narrative about forefathers of the Biblical nation, about exodus from Egypt and the conquest of Eretz Israel. Typically scepticism of this kind is demonstrated by the researchers who, for the sake of their political aims, argue that the Scripture has been used by Zionists for justification of expulsion of Arabs from their land.

If D. Hazoni's articles deals with methodological principles of the «new archeology» D. Kontorer exposes the political underlying reasons of the «new archeology». The present day Israelis have demonstrated vulnerability to the powerful psychological pressure which has always exercised on the Jews and begot many renegades who assimilated the image of Jewry the anti-Semites instilled. The author concludes that when there is a social demand for ideas of certain kind these ideas find a place in any science. The Israeli scientists cultivate the intellectual soil for the forthcoming genocide of Jews.

The Far Eastern emigration, the integral part of the post-October Russian emigration, had a lot in common with the Russian emigration in Europe. However there were serious distinctions. A well organized and active fascist party in Manchuria is one of the peculiarities the White emigrants in China demonstrated. The author undertakes an effort to reveal reasons for emergence of a Russian fascist organization precisely in Harbin. The author analyzes the main program documents and the principal directions of this organization’s activities and provides characterization of the VFP leaders. The Russian fascist had quite clear ideological program (based on anti-Communism, anti-Sovietism and anti-Semitism. They waged struggle against the Soviet state vigorously and got a support from similar bodies in other countries and the Japanese military administration. The principal targets of the party were: accomplishment of the national revolution in Russia, overthrow of the Soviet power, establishment of the fascist dictatorship. The VFP succeeded in creation of its own subsidiary structures (women, youth, children organization) and in exercising of some control over emigrants' professional associations. However the White emigrants as a whole were obviously hostile to the VFP because of its unconcealed resemblance with the notorious Black hundreds, unscrupulous use of methods (including murders) and faithful service to the Japanese authorities.

The author compares four Russian reforms: The «Great reform» of 1861, Stolypin’s reform of 1906, the «Black redistribution» which was launched by the Decree on Land of 1917 and the New economic police introduced in 1921. The authors argues that the first two of these reforms were very well thought out from the scientific point of view and calculated but absolutely disregarded opinions and notions of the peasantry. These reforms were carried on by a clumsy and cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus and by violent means. Thus their implementation was delayed and their were doomed to failure. Reform of 1861 became a prologue to revolution of 1905 and Stolypin’s reform became a prologue to revolution of 1917. The Decree on Land was composed on the basis of village general meetings' resolutions that were made by peasants themselves. The Decree met and satisfied peasants' interests. That made it possible to carry out redistribution of land in a few months and thus to settle the land issue, even if by cruel methods. The same should be said of the NEP. The NEP which took into account demands of the peasantry allowed drawing Russia out of the profound crisis in the shortest time. According to the author these historical lessons have not been understood by the present day Russian reformers. The fact to a considerable extent explains the low efficiency of these reforms.

Despite its characteristically sharp essayistic tenor and scoffing passages, this article is a quite serious attempt at defining an historical-sociological meaning of the present moment of our history. More particularly, the subject matter is, on one hand, the debacle of «democratic forces» and strengthening of autocratic rule, and on the other — a rehabilitation of the normal, civilized ethic, human at large as well as in economic behavior, which was repressed by an ethos of the so called «primary accumulation». An organic interconnection of the two tendencies is demonstrated, along with an exposure of fundamental falsity of the «parochially liberal» outlook on the development of modern civilization, which prevailed up to now in the mind of Russian powers that be and which largely retains its sway.