In the post-Cold War era, Ukraine is struggling with more than political independence, but with her very identity. However, the ingredients in her identity derive from traditions that are incommensurable: westernism and Slavophilism. On the other hand, political independence for Ukraine is largely a formality, since she will become dependent upon either Russia or the European Union and NATO in significant economic and military respects. This paper argues, in part, that Ukraine should use its connections with the West to act as a bridge between western and eastern ways of life within a Slavic and Orthodox federation dedicated to a unity of peoples, but not a unity equated with absorption. The alternative is economic exploitation from western powers at the expense of her Orthodox and Slavic culture.

The author expresses his doubts about ability of Ukraine to enjoy the genuine, not a fictitious independence. Formation of the Ukrainian nation and «Ukraine» as a national organism has been carried out in opposition to everything Russian. Due to that the Ukrainian ideology from its very inception and onwards has the anti-Russian character. Combination of this peculiarity, predominance of bourgeois relationships, lack of economic prerequisites for independence as well as the fact that at the present time Russia is not a power pole on its own and is looking for ways to incorporate itself into the Western world which has its own system of values leaves no alternative way to Ukraine and pushes it into the West’s orbit.

Ukraine occupies a peculiar position on the very frontier between Europe and Russia. Geopolitical position of Ukraine has determined its historical development and is the most important factor defining the current course of the Ukrainian foreign policy. Ukraine which was not an independent state until the end of the 20th century used to be the arena of geopolitical struggle among Russia and European powers: Poland, Austria and Germany. As the independence was declared in 1991 Ukraine confronted with a necessity to choose its path: whether it would run for Europe or for Russia? This dilemma is still unresolved completely even now. The author tries to demonstrate that the choice in favor of integration with Russia fits the national interests of Ukraine while the choice in favor of the EU, on the contrary, would be pernicious for the state sovereignty and the national identity of Ukraine.

At the present moment Ukraine happened to stand on the very «fault line of civilizations» between the East and the West, Europe and Russia. Not just economic weakness of Russia but also lack of any universal cultural and civilization idea on the part of Russia may in the nearest future become one of the main factors prompting Ukraine and other European states of the post-Soviet space to aim at the European Union. Under these circumstances Ukraine would experience great difficulties in its attempts to vindicate its «peculiar identity» and national and cultural distinctiveness.

Ukraine’s choice ought not to be posed as one between a soulless West and spiritual East. An idealized Slavic Orthodox culture, in particular, exists today neither in Russia or Ukraine, and it is still harder to find in the tsarist past. Rather, Ukraine ought to reconstruct its own democratic, independent modern culture based on its traditions of Cossack autonomy, Magdeburg Law, opposition to autocratic centralism, even its autocephalous Orthodox Church history and Christian and populist social ethics. The success of Ukraine and its survival will also make success for Russia’s transformation from despotic empire to democratic nation-state.

National identification happens to become a problem in the period of encroaching globalization. How can one speak of construction of proper Ukrainian civilization when the very notion of civilization is questioned? What can this hypothetical national state be and what it has to do in such new world? Should it increase «multi-vector» policy or should it become a sort of a bridge between the West and East? But is Ukraine ready to withstand durability tests that are applied to any bridge? The author thinks that Ukraine is definitely not ready for such trials. Strength of Russian as well as of Ukraine is connected with the creative power of cultivated political and cultural synthesis. However this is also the weakness for either common ideal or the common enemy may ensure a tight unification of such society.

The article deals with the study of culture sources which is a new and logically necessary trend in the present day historical science. The author defines boundaries of the method which has been substantiated recently (A.V.Karavashkin, A.L.Yurganov. Essay in historical phenomenology: Difficult path to the evident truth. Moscow, 2003). Principles of study of culture’s sources are compared with methodological propositions and assumptions of the French «Annales» school of historical studies and of the Russian positivism. The author argues that none of these schools could surmount the deficiencies of the modern hermeneutics. The modern hermeneutics has been focused on the problem of the unconsciousness, it has investigated the collective psychology but it has been indifferent to understanding of sources. An author’s presence in the text, the reality of an author’s consciousness and experience of direct statements become the matter of study of culture’s sources. For the first time investigation of the evident consciousness, immediate reflection of the subjects of historical process are acquiring their peculiar method.

The author deals with problems of the state ideology development in the 17th century, the last century of the Muscovite Tsardom’s existence. A succession of violent events started with the Troubled times, presented a series of complicated issues to the state and the people. Decisions of these issues had to determine the further course of Russia’s historical development. Like many other powers the Russian kingdom had to reconsider and reappraise the system of relationships between the Tsar and the people and to make a definite decision on the desirable character of the authority, whether it should have been an elective or hereditary one, limited or absolute. Relationships of the State and the Church acquired a peculiar acuteness. Later on these problems transformed into «Moscow is the Third Rome» and «Moscow is the New Jerusalem» theories. The problem of attitude toward possibility of reformation and innovations was one of the crucial issues the Russian society confronted with. Uneasy, fraught and connected with the social upheavals and conflicts solution of all these issues made the 17th century «the century of choice» in the Russian history.

1943 proved to be the turning point of the WW II. The states of the Nazi block lost their chance to win the war. On the Soviet-German front the roll of war started to move westwards. The battle of Kursk (April, 5, 1943 to August 23, 1943) became the key event. Mountains of books have been written about the battle on Orel-Kursk bulge. However these books, as a rule, elucidate only military aspect of the war. The aim of this article is to demonstrate interdependence of our strategy and policy during the year which became the turning point of the war, to demonstrate how the strategic successes of the Red Army on the battlefields were converted into the political victories (Tehran) and how all of that changed image of our army and image of the USSR in the world.

The author defines methodological approaches to investigation of the problem, shows the USSR’s attitude to the Slovakian national uprising during its preparation and the specific assistance given to insurgents during two months of their struggle against Wehrmacht forces that occupied Slovakia. The author argues that a historian can understand motives that guided Moscow in making specific decisions only if he/she considers these motives in the context of relations within anti-Hitlerite coalition at that time, in the context of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian relations, of the USSR’s military strategy and the USSR’s political plans for Central and Eastern Europe as a region. Having understood as early as during preparation for the uprising that it did not contradict the national and state interests of the USSR, that Communists took an active part in organization of the uprising and that Czechoslovakian émigré government was interested in the uprising, the Soviet leadership and personally I. V. Stalin made the principal decision to support the uprising. Allies of the USSR were not going to render an effective assistance to the insurgents for they thought that such assistance was the business of the USSR because Slovakia fell within the Soviet zone of hostilities. The Soviet military command, with Stalin’s approval, modified the Red Army’s military plans to establish interaction with the revolted detachments of the Slovakian army and partisans. The USSR provided the insurgents with the feasible assistance with arms and munitions though due to various reasons could not satisfy the insurgents' requests to the full.

Reviews written by «Aveskhan of Macedonia, the popular expert» appeared in the Russian education related media in the second half of 1990s. It was precisely the moment when the so called «alternatives» proclaimed by the RF Ministry of education started to bring specific fruits and schools began to get such textbooks that simply could not be reviewed seriously. One could either cry or laugh. Aveskhan of Macedonia preferred the second option (though it was laughter through tears). And the very appearance of this person was connected to «History of Russia up to Peter the Great reign» textbook by A.P.Bogdanov (Moscow, Drofa Publishers, 1996). This textbook suggested the correspondence of «Russian princes» Asan and Aveskhan (both of whom had never existed in the reality) with Alexander of Macedonia which schoolchildren had to study. A lot of such textbooks was published since 1996. All of them were duly decorated with «Recommended by the Ministry of education» stamp. Every time when the Minister of education at press conferences is asked to comment on a next «discovery» from a successive textbook (examples of such «discoveries» are statements like «any bee may become a drone bee» or «Moslems are pagans» or «Ancient Greece was a single centralized state with the capital in Athens» etc.) the Minister puts the blame on unqualified experts, careless authors and publishers, in short, on whomever he likes but not on himself or his officials. It should be emphasized that it is precisely the Ministry which «recommends» or «permits» such obvious, a fortiori nonsense. The problem is why the Ministry recommends this nonsense. There are two feasible alternatives: 1) due to ignorance and professional incompetence; 2) it is done deliberately. A new publication by Aveskhan of Macedonia contains information valuable for a correct answer to the question.