The author focuses her attention on the problem of unrecognized or self-proclaimed states. Nowadays the problem became one of the most obvious manifestations of the international law chaotization. The process began in the late 20th century. Nevertheless up to 2008 normative value of such documents as the UN Charter and the Final act of the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Act) have been never challenged. The more so the fundamental principles laid in the basis of the international legal order that was established after the World War II. The situation changed drastically after 2008. The author pays a particular attention to events happened in 2008 since it were precisely these events that, in a great extent, created the context ignoring which it is impossible neither to grasp specifics of the Donbass phenomenon (despite the wide spread opinion that has little in common with the first post-Soviet unrecognized republics), nor duly appreciate tenacity demonstrated by the still unrecognized Trans-Dniester Moldavian Republic and Nagorno-Karabkh Republic in their fighting for the territory of right. As the author shows in the concluding part of the article, the significance of this tenacity goes far beyond confines of these republics.

The author focuses on a new situation which is emerging around so called «unrecognized states» on the post-Soviet expanse by the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. After 2008 when Russia recognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia two states remained to be unrecognized: Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Transnistrian Moldavian Republic. The fact that these two states are still unrecognized makes prospects of their recognition even more uncertain. Meanwhile the public opinion in Karabakh and Transnistria perceived acts of Russia as a coarse selection which was deprived of any legal ground. That could not but have impact on the people’s self-perception. The author emphasizes that due to peculiar historical circumstances that relates predominantly to Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria) and concentrates attention on situation in this state. The author notes the contrast between changes in conscience of the Transnistrian people and the RF leadership slow response to the «Transnistrian settlement» which over the past year has moved to the center of Western states' foreign policy attention. In conclusion the author emphasizes that such inertia on the part of Russia taken together with indifference of the preponderant part of the Russian public to developments on the Dniester in future may turn back to Russia by loss of considerable part of Russia’s influence in the South-Western direction.

The article is devoted to analysis of the Russian Orthodox Church present day position and attitude to the Soviet period of Russia’s history. In connection with that the author refers to the prehistory of the question and considers evidence provided by representatives of those cultural and proper church Russian traditions from which the higher clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate has recently taken an increasing distance. A particular attention is paid to the Moscow Patriarchate hierarchs’ opinions of causes and character of the Great Patriotic war that were aired in the course of the outgoing year. In the concluding part of the article the author examines possible general meanings of these new trends as well as of reunification of the Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate and of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.

In the final part of her article the author focuses оn shifts that occur in the social psychology. These shifts are results of triumph of a specific version of the consumer society which has established in Russia. Triumph of this modification is combined with the most rough and ruthless ideology of inequality. It should be emphasized that, from the author’s viewpoint, precisely these deformations of the public conscience constitute the main principle of the paradox described in previous parts of the article. The Russian public is unwilling to break a movement which, according to the opinion which is gaining increasing currency, leads to deadlock. In conclusion the author comes back to the current situation in France. She demonstrates that despite a very strong historical commitment of the French to the ideal of equality the French public conscience is absolutely unwilling to appreciate significance of social and political processes that go on in Russia nowadays and to put these processes in the proper global context.

Outbreak of the youth and students' protest which occurred in France in spring of 2006 has aroused very little attention and a weak reaction in Russia. That presents a sharp contrast with evaluations provided by the European observers and politicians who have seen these protests as one of the most vivid and obvious symptoms of the «end of epoch» mood which has begun to emerge in the West. The dominant note of this mood is the Angst to lose the social achievements conquered from 1950s to 1970s. The young people are afraid to find out that they are poorer than their parents and to lose the social guaranties that have become customary constants. Different opinions are brought out in respect of what should be considered as the determinant feature of the departing epoch. The author focuses on convergence of ideologies for this issue is the most accurate description of the problem’s scale. The name of the carrier of the ideology which underwent the convergence is the USSR. This approach highlights the generally valid social consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse.

In this part of her article the author continues her investigation of the end of the social guaranties epoch. However she focuses on Russia where this end manifests in the unprecedented harsh and cruel form. Alongside with that slackness, shapelessness of the society’s responses to the process are also unprecedented, particularly in comparison with the similar events in France (these events were investigated in the previous issue of the magazine). Avoiding construction of linear relations the author suggests her answer to the question about certain reasons for this paradox.

The author highlights the complicated and painful topic of evolution which the national memory about the Russian history greatest event (victory over Hitlerite Germany) undergoes. As 60th anniversary of the victory has demonstrated, an enormous part of our society is not just losing the tie with meanings of the victory but is ceasing to get interest in these meanings. At the same time events and personalities of that epoch, by virtue of their immensity that nobody can annul, still keep to be a matter of political and psychological maneuvers that are very dangerous for Russia as well as for the world at large. We are drawing up nearer and yet nearer to the line beyond which the final and ultimate revision of WWII results and re-coding of its meanings become possible. Some facts indicate to possible revaluation of roles performed in that war by Germany and the USSR-Russia. Aftermath of such revision may prove to be really tragic for Russia. Meanwhile the destructive work the principal tool of which is manipulation with the public conscience aimed at elimination of the very ability to perceive the heroic and the sacred in history goes on unabated. Thereby a path to revenge of the innermost occult Nazi idea is opened and paved. This idea asserts that access to the heroic is the privilege conferred to supermen. Therefore opposition to this work means inheritance of anti-Nazism traditions to the same extent as this work continuation means acceptance of the Third Reich traditions.

In recent months the public opinion in Russia as well as abroad has been once again drawn to the problem of relations between Vatican and the Russian Orthodox Church or, speaking in broader terms, between Catholics and Russian Orthodox believers. The decision of Vatican to establish four Catholic bishoprics on the territory of Russia in which the Russian Orthodox Church leaders saw an encroachment upon their «canonic territories» served as the pretext for deterioration of these relations. The issue has transgressed the limits of purely legal dispute and touched the broad masses of believers as well as the high echelons of politicians. Relying on strong arguments of those people who consider the very notion of «canonic territories» as an invalid stationery innovation and considering the accusations of proselytizing aggression on the territory of the Russian Federation that are usually addressed to the Catholic Church as unfounded the author transfers the issue in a broader and deeper historical context. The author focuses her attention on the staring contradiction between the consent the Russian Orthodox Church has granted to the principal ideologic assumption of post-Soviet Russia (i.e., «entering the European alias civilized community») and its desire to retain, as a norm of behavior for its flock, the traditional apprehension in regard of Catholicism. However, Catholicism constitutes the historical foundation of the European civilization. Sure, preceding from so contradictory assumptions the Russian Orthodox Church confronts a difficulty in elaboration of a clear and consistent line of behavior. The failure of the Russian Orthodox Church’s attempts to prevent the Pontific’s visits to the East Christian space or at least to the CIS countries is the convincing evidence of this impossibility. Analysis of the process' dynamics leads the author to conclusion that the stubborn attempts of the Russian Orthodox Church to solve the problem of its influence by appealing only to the power intervention of the state and by artificial instigation of its flock’s fear of the Catholic proselytism threat just divert the Russian Orthodox Church from grasping the problem’s essence.

The author focuses the attention on the Russians' inability to define their attitude to the «Soviet heritage». The author points out that this inability is quite typical for the political self-conscience of contemporary Russia. Having begun its own development with the avalanche-like, ideologically motivated rout of the Soviet heritage (the greatest rage was brought down on results of the World War II) nowadays the contemporary political conscience faces grave problems of both the social and political (the destruction of the national-historical identity) and the state and legal nature. This array of problems includes, in particular the problem of definition of the territory Russia imposes its sovereignty. This problem, in its most acute form, arises in respect of the territories the Russian Federation owns only as the successor to the USSR, the power which won the victory in the World War II. Obviously, the Russian Federation's titles to such territories are justified only to the extent to which the Russian Federation embraces the idea of the succession as an element of the basis of its new statehood being.