The article is devoted to the little-studied aspects of the history of the Great Northern War – the two Braunschweig Congresses (1713–1714, 1719–1721), convened to draw up a peace treaty between the belligerent powers. The initiative belonged to Austria which sought through its undivided mediation to achieve a peace that would meet, above all, the longterm interests of the Holy Roman Empire. These attempts were bitterly opposed by England and France who also claimed the mediation role and had their own views about the post-war European order. The situation was aggravated by sharp contradictions within the camp of Sweden's opponents and their intention to deprive Peter I of the legal reward for his military victories. As a result, the “concert” approach to the problem of a peaceful settlement proposed by Emperor Charles VI was rejected in favor of a series of separate agreements with Stockholm.

Saxony-Poland was most strange Russia`s ally in the Great Northern War. Russo-Polish tensions deeply rooted in history made it hard to imagine the possibility of their cooperation against Sweden. Nevertheless by 1700 they found themselves united in anti-Swedish coalition. The authors of the article assert that the factors which contributed to the emergence of the alliance between Peter the Great and Augustus II were initially charged with destructive potential strong enough to undermine the Northern Alliance long before the Nystadt Congress of 1721.

In the third and final part of the article the authors came to the conclusion that the Russian-Swedish tensions had not played a major role in the origins of the Great Northern War. It was initiated by other states with long-standing claims against Sweden that resulted in permanent conflicts. Although Russia was not going to constantly put up with its lack of access to the Baltic shores and wanted at least to regain its native Northern lands lost to the Swedes in the early 17th century it had to wait patiently until the right time. The propitious moment might have come much later than 1700 if not for the signing of a long-cherished peace treaty with Turkey. This saved tsar Peter from the threat of war which would have made him postpone the revenge over Sweden indefinitely.

This story opens a series of articles devoted to the prehistory of the Great Northern War seen through separate contexts of diplomatic relationships between Russia, on the one hand, and each member of anti-Swedish coalition, on the other. The author starts with a detailed analysis of the intense activity of two consecutive Danish missions in Moscow – one led by Gildebrand von Horn, another by Paul Heins. They did their utmost to seduce tsar Peter by fabulous prospects promised by the future allied victory over the Swedes. He, however, was guided by his own thoughts as to the circumstances that would justify the risk of war against most powerful state in Northern Europe.