The present day Russian reality does not create a genuine series of events. What we are experiencing is waiting for what has already happened. And from this point of view the collapse of the USSR and of Communism should be considered to be the main event of 2002 as well as preceding ones. People in the West argue that Communism and Fascism are the first principal foes of the humankind now defeated by liberalism. This blatant lie was irrefutably and definitely rejected by such authorities as Churchill and Roosevelt who were absolutely sure that Fascism was defeated precisely by Communism already has bad repercussions for its authors. Having put the end to Communism (not by winning but by corrupting it) and made Communism equal to Fascism the Western civilization has lost its last chance, the ideological and mobilization resource necessary for struggle of the progressive humanism with the encroaching obscurantism. As regards Russia it has experienced the social hybridization, i. e., intertwining of the worst characteristics of the Soviet socialism with the worst characteristics of the criminal «presumable», «as if» capitalism. A terrible process has been launched. This process is capable to transform the Russian statehood into nothing. On the eve of the imminent conflicts of civilizations the greater part of the Russia media works for corruption of the army, the people, the society, the elite. It is to say that media works for the death and destruction of the country.

At the emerged turning point of epochs Russia experiences the crisis of meaning. Crisis of this type is one of the most dangerous for a social organism. This crisis finds its expressions in transitory nature of the suggested receipts of development, fragility of the social contract between the power and the governed, instability of the state’s position in the international community, and, finally, in lack of the elite «national corporation» which unites carriers of these meanings. The author considers preconditions for creation of the Russian system of strategic analysis and planning, describes modern systems and methods of forecasting, social and cultural foundations of the contemporary global situation. The author also expounds some considerations related to the current difficult external and internal situation of Russia as well as to Russia’s prospects for development. A great attention is devoted to phenomenon of the transnational elite’s new class («the fourth estate») which is genetically connected with intellectual production and, in particular, with formation of information and communication sphere. The strategic alliance of this social group with the mobile segment of the «third estate» predetermined the prevailing trends' character that, in their turn, are connected with formation of the geo-economic universe and making of the preventive global security system.

As the Presidential election are approaching the more vigorously various political forces appeal to the conservative values and traditions. Doing that every political force invests the content advantageous to impart into the concept of conservatism. In every specific moment and in every specific country this concept acquires a new meaning. There are no «pure» or «impure» conservatives for the very criteria of conservatism are different and a former revolutionary and an subversive may, upon coming to power, turn into an guard and adherent of a strong state. The Russian conservatism is unlike its European and American parallels. It is paradoxical and unique. It is imbued with the national traditions but it tried and still tries, though timidly, to provide answers to challenges of the time. Though, at the first glance, the contemporary political situation seems to be stable in fact it is fraught with unpredictable developments. In this respect the present day situation is very similar to the «conservative stabilization» Russia experienced during Alexander III reign. That conservative stabilization carried in itself three revolutions that overthrew the dynasty. That is why the most pure conservatism (i.e., the unsophisticated preservation of the status quo) has no chance in Russia. The same is true in respect of conservatism calling for return into the «bright yesterday». The current fashion for conservatism, on one hand, has already provoked discussions among historians, sociologists and political scientists (and the fact is positive in itself) but, on the other hand, it made a mess of the very notion of conservatism. All these developments make us to ponder about correlation between the historical experience of use of the conservative ideology in Russia and problems of the contemporary conservatism.

The article deals with two principal problems: the first problem is dynamics of population growth and changes of ethnic-national structure of Central Asian countries and the second problem is the population’s general standards and conditions of living. Proceeding from massive statistical data including those provided by general censuses the author discovers the picture of drastic decrease of numbers and specific weight of the Slavic (European) population and increase of the so-called title (i. e., indigenous) population. Study of birth rates and fertility allows making a conclusion that all Central Asian countries will experience a further decrease of population growth in the nearest future. The real wages of workers and employees shrank two-fourfold during the deep economic crisis (in Tajikistan the decrease was even more pronounced). Thus now real wages and salaries do not exceed several dozens of dollars. It should be noted that in the course of the whole period of restoration, i. e., in the second half of 1990s real wages still remained to be 20−40% less (in Tajikistan they were two thirds less) than the pre-crisis maximum levels. Results of households' consumption studies and studies of retail trade turnover’s movements are presented. In general these results are similar to changes of real wages. The author considers dwelling conditions and the main components of the social infrastructure, the public health and education. Conditions of these components in general reflected dynamics of other standards of living though manifested a greater margin of safety. However the quality of education and medical care obviously deteriorated.

The article deals with techniques and fundamental philosophical assumptions of the contemporary studies of literature and cultural-historical concepts. Claiming the solution of the humanitarian knowledge’s principal issues representatives of subjectivist directions make ideological arguments their main weapon and thereby overcome, in their own fashion, positivist assumptions. However the humanitarian knowledge oriented towards ideology inadvertently turns out to be an ally of the post-modernist epistemology. Scholar’s «egoism» and consumerists super-tasks set against the collective experience of science are conquering the unoccupied intellectual space. And now personal opinion or personal faith of a scientist, freedom of his/her conscience means by far more than the source-aware conscience’s reality. Two polar approaches to the history of culture, the conservative and liberal-atheistic approaches are compared to each other. In both cases representatives of the respective concepts refer to their own positions as to an important fact of science and a theoretical model. Strangely enough, polarities complement each other: studies of literature that make the absolute of the immutable and studies of culture that assume the making without the subject of the process generate equally destructive and disorganizing effect on the modern humanitarian science. These extremities need not so much reconciliation as a dialectical and creative overcoming, a renewing synthesis.

The article analyses both the objective and subjective factors accountable for «the long peace» in Europe from 1815 to 1853. Most important among them was not only the Vienna Settlement per se but also the ability of the Great Powers' rules to implement it. As author contends, the leading role in maintenance of European stability which was threatened by the social revolution and the Eastern question belonged, in the long run, to «Russian policemen» Alexander I and Nicholas I since it was Russia that obtained in the aftermath of the 1815 the best position, in terms of power politics, to curb extremely destructive developments on the international arena.