The state in Russia has always been an instrument for realization of a certain universal project. The great power notion is incompatible with the new Russian tradition and culture because there is no link between the statehood and a universal project in these tradition and culture. The author notes that in choosing sides between antagonists of statehood and supporters of statehood whose main plank, patriotism plus globalism is alien to him, he nevertheless takes the side of the latter. The idea of entering the New world order which conquered minds of the overwhelming majority is absolutely suicidal for Russia. A considerable humanistic potential for forced spiritual growth which was accumulated within the Soviet civilization is much needed now for Russia as well as for the whole world and the more so than ever in the past. The author thinks that strengthening of the President’s power vertical is required but he sees no actual steps in the right direction. It is impossible to build the power vertical in a society which lacks verticals of meanings, values, ideas.

In this part of the article the author describes the process of the world economy’s transformation in the neoliberal vein: demise of Bretton-Woods agreements and development of system of characteristics within the Washington consensus as well as the post-Washington consensus program. The author expounds the essence of the neoliberal transformation of economy and shows that the strong economies are affected by these transformations rather mildly and efficiency of such economies can be greatly enhanced due to efforts taken by the state as a regulator of economy. On the contrary, a weak economy is quite vulnerable and if it is entering the neoliberal regime it is susceptible to pressures of the old negative as well as of new negative factors. At the same time all compensatory mechanisms that existed earlier cease to act. Thus the neoliberal model produces only minuses, one of which is a tendency to increase the mass of shadow and criminal economy. The author’s conclusion is that only a regulated mixed economy may be really efficient.

The author deals with issues related to the current situation and prospects of historical museums’ development in the Russian society as a phenomenon of social, political and cultural life. According to the author, a museum which reproduces models of the past with the help of genuine remnants of the tradition and culture serves not just preservation of the heritage but helps to a critical analysis of the social norms and values and to their authentic reproduction. This fact explains a museum’s bent for rational scientific methods of interpretation of the heritage. That is why a museum is an important vehicle to maintain the historical conscience. The collapse of the Communist ideology brought about disintegration of the Greater Russian national state tradition which crumbled into multitude of particular local archaic traditions that once had been constituent parts of the Greater tradition. The same trend caused disintegration of integral exhibition into array of different ones. The author contends that cognitive assumptions implied in a museum allow to perceive the historical process as a whole.

The article deals with analysis of the state government ways that were peculiar for V. I. Lenin. The author also considers Lenin’s ideas of the state apparatus’ efficiency. The analysis is based on the correspondence Lenin carried on as the leader of the Soviet government. The analysis demonstrates that Lenin completely disregarded all formal characteristics of the state such as its organization model, functional specialty or level of competence. Lenin understood the state apparatus as a combination of persons distinguished not by their posts or positions within the structure but by their individual abilities. For Lenin, the statesmanship consisted in free manipulation with individuals which was combined with imposing the absolute responsibility for everything on the appointed commissioners extraordinary. At the end of the article the author compares Lenin’s methods of government with the methods peculiar to the present day Russian government.

The author deals with the process of a parliamentary republic making in Moldova and the impact of the process on Moldova's foreign policy including relations with Russia and Transnistria (Dniester Republic) problem. Although the political life of all «post-Soviet space» except the Baltic republics is dominated by the presidential power strengthening, recent changes in Moldova's political system indicate that a parliamentary republic is in making. These changes have caused certain shifts in Moldova's foreign policy: development of relations with the European Union and the initiative of some Moldavian political parties to establish an intergovernmental union with Romania. This policy can undermine the balance of power in the region, system of the Russian regional interests in particular. Russia's policy towards Moldova is focused on the search of balance between president P.Luchinskii, Moldavian Communist party which has the biggest fraction in the Moldavian Parliament, and the government of Dniester Republic. Under new political circumstances the support Russia provides for the single political power in Moldova, the Communist party and its leader P.Voronin is neither effective nor realistic option. The relations between Russia and Transnistria can also become complicated by new political struggle in this Republic. Without the multidimensional approach which takes into due account all players and analysis of new political situation in this region Russia's ability to protect its own interests here will be seriously curtailed.

In part II of his article the author dwells at length on consideration of the events which brought about deceleration of the economic reform in the USSR and then to its curtailment and its ultimate suspension. The author also considers the Prime-Minister’s international activities and demonstrates how Kosyghin was gradually driven aside despite his several major achievements. The author notes that Kosyghin’s political and physical demise coincided with the moment when it became clear the Soviet military-mobilization system could not be modernized. The real international rapprochement was over, a new round of the cold war began which the USSR would lose.

Even during the Troubled times when Russia experienced a painful and profound crisis, Moscow state tried to maintain contacts with Persia and to protect its interests in the Caucasian region. On his part, the Shah of Persia was looking for chances of rapprochement with Tsars of Moscow, Boris Godunov, Dmitri the False I and Vassily Shuiski. Shah needed their support in his struggle with the empire of Osman Turks. This consideration did not prevent Shah from planning annexation of southern Russian lands at the culmination of the Troubled times. Only restoration of the state and order in Moscow made Shah Abbas I to repudiate such plans and helped to revival of friendly relations between Russia and Persia.